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ABSTRACT
Research into self-aﬃrmation has almost exclusively employed
experimental manipulations. In this paper we address individual
diﬀerences in the tendency to respond to threats with self-aﬃrming
cognitions and distinguish this from two overlapping constructs:
habitual positive self-thought and trait self-esteem. Items we
designed to measure self-aﬃrmation were represented by three
ﬁrst-order factors and loaded on a higher-order factor, creating the
Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure (SSAM). The SSAM correlated
moderately with self-esteem and habitual positive self-thought. In
competitive analyses, the SSAM was an independent predictor of a
large number of outcomes. The studies provide evidence about the
correlates of individual diﬀerences in reported spontaneous self-
aﬃrmation in response to threat and the contribution made to this
response by habitual positive self-thought and trait self-esteem.
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According to Self-Aﬃrmation Theory (Steele, 1988) people are motivated to maintain a
self-concept they experience as being “adaptively and morally adequate” (Steele, 1988,
p. 262). When this self-perception is threatened, they can bolster or restore this experi-
ence of self-adequacy through self-aﬃrmation. People can self-aﬃrm through “explana-
tion, rationalization and/or action” (Steele, 1988, p. 262). For example, they may think
about their personal strengths, bring to mind their core values, reﬂect upon their
important relationships, or act in a way that demonstrates their moral or adaptive
adequacy. Considerable evidence has now accumulated of the prophylactic and restora-
tive eﬀects of self-aﬃrmation on processes and outcomes aﬀected by a wide range of
threats to the self, including those arising from performance expectations associated
with stereotypes, health-promotion materials, and stress (see Cohen & Sherman, 2014;
Harris & Epton, 2009, 2010; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; for reviews).
In the decades since Steele outlined the theory, researchers have prioritized experi-
mental manipulations in which participants are instructed to self-aﬃrm rather than
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doing so spontaneously in response to perceived threats. In the process, much has been
learned about the eﬀects of self-aﬃrmation. Nevertheless, this has led to a disjunction
between the empirical ﬁndings and those theoretical elements that describe how self-
aﬃrmation functions as a natural, even spontaneous response to everyday self-threats.
We are conducting a program of research into natural, undirected, spontaneous self-
aﬃrmation that is designed to help redress this imbalance. Here we report the ﬁndings
from ﬁve studies from this program, with others being reported in supplemental
materials. In particular, we explore in this paper the role of three inter-related elements:
(a) the tendency to respond to threats with aﬃrming self-related cognitions, (b) the
tendency to automatically and habitually think positively about the self, and (c) trait self-
esteem. Our guiding assumption is that spontaneous self-aﬃrmation has an existence
separate from automatic positive self-related cognitions and self-esteem, although the
latter two concepts are expected to correlate positively with it. We begin by brieﬂy
summarizing the core ﬁndings from several decades of research on self-aﬃrmation
before introducing our approach and measures.
Self-aﬃrmation and threats to self-integrity
People are hypothesized to self-aﬃrm when they experience a threat to their “self-
integrity” or sense of moral and adaptive adequacy (Steele, 1988). Such “psychological
threat[s]” arise from “the perception of an environmental challenge to the adequacy of
the self” (Cohen & Sherman, 2014, p. 335). Psychological threats are ubiquitous and
often commonplace (e.g., slights and experiences of failure). Self-aﬃrmation enables
those disturbed by such threats to bolster their sense of self-adequacy (Cohen &
Sherman, 2014).
To self-aﬃrm, people turn to the qualities that are central to how they see them-
selves. Self-aﬃrmation involves bringing to mind any self-conception or image that
bolsters or restores the individual’s sense of being “competent, good, coherent, . . .” or
of otherwise possessing self-integrity (Steele, 1988, p. 262). By making such self-deﬁning
sources of identity salient, self-aﬃrmation serves to provide perspective and reassurance
to the individual confronting a psychological threat (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman &
Cohen, 2006). As a consequence, self-aﬃrmation can promote stability in self-perception
in the face of psychological threat.
Developed out of Steele’s reinterpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Theory (e.g.,
Steele, 1975) one of the key insights of Self-Aﬃrmation Theory is that, when coping
with psychological threats, people are not restricted to dealing with the focal or
provoking threat. As well as coping by trying to reduce or eliminate the threat, or
diminishing perceptions of its severity or personal relevance, they can respond by self-
aﬃrming. For example, smoking can pose not only a physical threat to health, but also a
psychological threat, by challenging a smoker’s sense that she acts sensibly and controls
important behavior. According to Self-Aﬃrmation Theory, a smoker may cope with this
threat to self-adequacy by self-aﬃrming, employing any cognition or action of suﬃcient
importance to her sense of being a worthwhile and adequate person that it oﬀsets the
challenge that smoking presents to her self-integrity. She may, for example, remind
herself that she is a good mother or daughter or a talented musician. This is because,
according to the theory, “people are concerned with the big picture: they regulate their
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defensive adaptations to maintain very general conceptions of self-integrity rather than
to remedy speciﬁc threats” (Steele, 1988, p. 289). This aﬀords people considerable
ﬂexibility in how they respond to psychological threats. Subsequent extensions of the
theory (e.g., Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 2013; Sherman & Cohen, 2006) have built
on this core assumption.
According to Self-Aﬃrmation Theory, therefore, one consequence of such ﬂexibility is
that self-aﬃrmation can be a source of accuracy and objectivity, rather than distortion, in
information processing. By reminding the individual that his or her self-worth is not
solely dependent on the threatened domain, self-aﬃrmation can reduce the extent to
which information in that domain threatens the self and enable the individual to engage
in more open-minded appraisal of potentially threatening self-relevant information.
The prediction that self-aﬃrmation may be a source of accuracy and objectivity in
information processing has been supported by a large body of research (Cohen &
Sherman, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). For example, in the health domain, evidence
suggests that experimental manipulations of self-aﬃrmation can reduce and even
eliminate defensive resistance to unwelcome health-risk information and encourage
greater readiness to change risky behavior (Epton, Harris, Kane, Van Koningsbruggen,
& Sheeran, 2015). In the educational context, self-aﬃrmation manipulations have elimi-
nated the achievement gap induced by stereotype threat in African American students
(e.g., Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009) and Latino American
students (Brady et al., 2016; Sherman et al., 2013) and improved the performance of
women studying science (Miyake et al., 2010).
Self-aﬃrming naturally and spontaneously may therefore be associated with tenden-
cies towards resistance and stability – because self-aﬃrmation provides a means of
assuaging threats without acting upon the source of those threats – but also with
readiness to embrace information and change – because self-aﬃrmation provides a
means of confronting threat and thereby reducing defensive resistance. Whether one
tendency predominates and, if so, which, in whom and when, are among the questions
at the heart of the research program of which the studies reported in this paper form
part. Our working hypothesis, based on experimental ﬁndings on self-aﬃrmation, was
that the tendency to self-aﬃrm naturally would be associated predominantly with
greater openness to threatening information and with generally adaptive responses to
challenges and threats.
Spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and self-esteem
By “spontaneous” self-aﬃrmation we mean naturalistic self-aﬃrmation that contrasts
with self-aﬃrmation as a manipulation by being “unforced” and occurring naturally as
the individual’s free response to a perceived psychological threat. Such a tendency has
received much less empirical attention than its experimental counterpart, but it has not
been entirely neglected as an explanation: recent work has seen researchers advance
spontaneous or naturalistic self-aﬃrmation interpretations of phenomena including
expressive writing in cancer patients (Creswell et al., 2007), product choice and con-
sumption (Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010; Townsend & Sood, 2012), the response to threats to
body image (Bergstrom, Neighbors, & Malheim, 2009) or to vicarious defeat among
sports fans (Cornil & Chandon, 2013), and social media use (Toma & Hancock, 2013).
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Of particular relevance to the research reported here is an important early contribu-
tion to theorizing about spontaneous self-aﬃrmation made by Spencer, Josephs, and
Steele (1993), who placed the question of individual diﬀerences in resiliency to self-
threats at the heart of the analysis: “clearly all of us ﬂuctuate in this respect; sometimes
and in some settings, we are more resilient than at other times or in other settings. But
personal experience suggests there are reliable individual diﬀerences in this capacity”
(Spencer et al., 1993, pp. 21–22). Spencer and colleagues proposed that the basis for
such individual diﬀerences lies in the self-evaluative resources available to the individual
with which to self-aﬃrm. They proposed that those diﬀerences are derived, in turn, from
diﬀerences in self-esteem, arguing that those high in trait self-esteem have more self-
evaluative resources on which to draw than those low in self-esteem and are conse-
quently more able to self-aﬃrm, and that some routes to self-aﬃrmation are more
available to those high in self-esteem, who can bear more potential costs in the form
of self-image threats. Their analysis is supported by research showing that, when primed
by self-esteem cues, those high in self-esteem respond in similar ways to those who
have been self-aﬃrmed experimentally (e.g. Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008;
Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), and engage in less compensatory self-enhancement
(Bergstrom et al., 2009; c/f Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999), and that self-esteem
moderates the impact of manipulated self-aﬃrmation on defensive responses, such that
those lower in self-esteem beneﬁt more (e.g., Düring & Jesssop, 2014; Holland, Meertens,
& Van Vugt, 2002; Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004; Stone & Cooper, 2003; though see Napper,
Harris, & Epton, 2009; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001; study 2). Overall, research suggests
that trait self-esteem may indeed aﬀect the capacity to beneﬁt from self-aﬃrmation
manipulations but that enhanced self-esteem is not a general consequence of self-
aﬃrmation (Armitage & Rowe, 2011; Sherman & Cohen, 2006).
When considering spontaneous self-aﬃrmation, therefore, Spencer et al. put the
question of individual diﬀerences in tendency to self-aﬃrm at the forefront (see also
Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) and considered it essentially in terms of individual diﬀer-
ences in self-esteem. We examine whether self-esteem is suﬃcient to explain individual
diﬀerences in self-aﬃrmation tendencies and associated outcomes.
Spontaneous self-aﬃrmation, self-esteem and habitual positive thinking
Based on the prominence of self-esteem in theoretical analyses of self-aﬃrmation
processes, we began our analysis by addressing the overlap between individual diﬀer-
ences in spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and in the strength of self-esteem related
resources. In our empirical research we test whether there are unique or residual
correlates of the items we designed to measure spontaneous self-aﬃrmation when
controlling for trait self-esteem. However, self-esteem related cognitions should provide
greatest beneﬁts when they are both available in memory and accessible in thought
(e.g., Spencer et al., 1993); yet measures of trait self-esteem typically assess self-esteem
related resources in terms of amount rather than salience or ease of generation. So, to
enable us to isolate this additional element – the tendency to automatically access
positive self-thoughts – we adapted an existing measure (the Habit Index of Negative
Thinking, HINT; Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Traﬁmow, & Woolf, 2007), rewording it so
that the items described habitual positive rather than negative self-related thinking. The
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resulting measure – the Habitual Index of Positive Thinking (HIPT) – enabled us to
identify the extent to which chronic individual diﬀerences in tendency to report acces-
sing positive self-thoughts contribute distinctively (i.e., independently of trait self-
esteem) to the propensity to respond to threats by aﬃrming self-related cognitions.
The arguments underpinning the importance of distinguishing these measures is as
follows. People high in self-esteem have more self-evaluative resources on which to
draw than those low in self-esteem and may therefore be more likely to self-aﬃrm
(Spencer et al., 1993). However, to facilitate this response, self-esteem related resources
need to be accessible in thought and memory; consequently, diﬀerences in tendency to
use self-aﬃrmation as a means of threat resolution may be determined by chronic
individual diﬀerences in the accessibility of, and not solely by diﬀerences in the amount
of, these resources. Consequently, self-esteem and habitual positive self-thinking
together may be suﬃcient to account for all measured individual diﬀerences in sponta-
neous self-aﬃrmation, and their associated outcomes. However, we hypothesize that
there are also individual diﬀerences in the tendency to directly respond to threats with
self-aﬃrming cognitions independent of the quantity and accessibility of self-esteem.
Evaluating empirically whether or not this is the case is a central aim of the work
reported in this paper.
Sources of self-aﬃrmation
To measure the tendency to respond to threats with aﬃrming self-related cognitions, we
drew on experimental research employing self-aﬃrmation manipulations and developed
a set of items explicitly assessing this response. To encourage people to self-aﬃrm,
researchers have most often employed manipulations in which participants consider
personally important values and, next most often, reﬂect upon personal resources such
as strengths and attributes, positive traits, skills and performances (McQueen & Klein,
2006). In recent years a literature has also developed that investigates self-aﬃrmation by
asking participants to reﬂect upon their positive social relationships (e.g., Burson,
Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012; Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2013; Chen & Boucher, 2008).
To measure spontaneous self-aﬃrmation we generated items to assess each of these
potentially personally aﬃrming domains: values and principles, strengths and attributes,
and social relationships. These sources of self-aﬃrmation are not meant to be comple-
tely exclusive or exhaustive – given the ﬂuidity of self-aﬃrmation processes, that is nigh
impossible – but to represent a useful starting point for the research program and, in
particular, one derived from major themes in the current literature.
These three sets of items enabled us to test a speciﬁc hypothesis – that those lower in
trait self-esteem will be less likely to focus on their personal strengths and attributes when
self-aﬃrming than will those higher in self-esteem. This hypothesis is based on the
assumption that people low in self-esteem have fewer self-evaluative resources on which
to draw than do those high in self-esteem (Spencer et al., 1993). We presume that those
lower in self-esteem are typically able to draw upon at least a modicum of positive social
relations and important personal values to sustain their self-aﬃrmations,1 but may lack a
sense of possessing many positive strengths attributes, traits, skills or performances,
whereas those higher in self-esteem will be likely to consider they possess positive
instances in all three domains and thus may be inclined to focus naturally on strengths
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and attributes as being most distinctive. It is important to note that this is an assumption
about the eﬀects of self-esteem on the perception of positive aspects of the self-concept
and not an assumption about the origins of self-esteem (e.g., Pelham & Swann Jr., 1989). It
is also a relative hypothesis, concerning the relative amounts of positive strengths and
attributes available to those diﬀering in self-esteem and was developed as a working
hypothesis of the research program that was open to empirical test.
Currently there is no clear rationale in Self-Aﬃrmation Theory for hypothesizing any
consistent eﬀects on outcomes from drawing predominantly on strengths or values or
relationships as a source of aﬃrmation. However, for exploratory purposes, and as a
contribution to understanding self-aﬃrmation processes more generally, we do test the
relations between the three sources and each of the outcomes assessed in the studies
reported in this paper. We report the ﬁndings in supplemental materials and brieﬂy
summarize them later in this paper (Section 5).
The current paper
The two principal goals of this paper are to (a) establish the relationships between the
three core measures – of responding with self-aﬃrming cognitions, habitual access to
positive self-thoughts, and trait self-esteem – and (b) examine their relative independent
contributions to self-aﬃrmation as a characteristic response to psychological threat.
Empirically, we will achieve this in two ways: First (Goal 1), by establishing the degree
of observed overlap among the self-aﬃrmation items, the HIPT items, and a trait self-
esteem scale (the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale [RSES], Rosenberg, 1965). Second (Goal
2), by evaluating their joint and unique contributions to relevant outcome variables. In
Section 1, we present hypotheses expanding our ﬁrst guiding assumption that our
measure of self-aﬃrmation is not subsumed by its joint relations with trait self-esteem
and habitual positive self-thought. In Sections 2–4, we present hypotheses expanding
our second guiding assumption that our measure of self-aﬃrmation predicts threat-
related outcome variables after controlling for trait self-esteem and habitual positive
self-thought. We pursue these goals in ﬁve studies presented in text, with others in
supplemental materials.
In two item-validation studies, reported in detail in supplemental materials, we assess
the empirical overlap among the initial self-aﬃrming cognition items, the HIPT and the
RSES. In Section 1 of this paper we report the ﬁnal stage of scale development for the
resulting spontaneous self-aﬃrmation measure (SSAM).
Section 1: structure and correlates of the SSAM
Factor structure
We begin by examining the factorial structure of the items we initially generated to
assess spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and those we adapted to assess automatic positive
self-thought, using exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor analysis. The initial item-valida-
tion studies are presented in supplemental materials and brieﬂy summarized here,
where we present in detail the second stage of scale construction and validation. To
assess spontaneous self-aﬃrmation in response to threat, two authors (LN, PH) ﬁrst
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generated items related to each of the three domains of self-aﬃrmation used in the
experimental literature: values and principles (e.g., “thinking about the things I believe
in”), strengths, abilities and attributes (e.g., “thinking about the things I am good at”),
and social relationships (e.g., “thinking about the people who are important to me”). We
worded the associated preamble and stem to make it clear that the items described
responses to threat rather than a tendency to reﬂect upon the self in the absence of
threat: “Sometimes when we face diﬃculties, challenges or problems in our daily lives
we can ﬁnd ourselves thinking about ourselves. We are interested in how often you ﬁnd
yourself thinking about yourself when things start to bother you.” To avoid concerns
about people being aware of the consequences of self-aﬃrmation or having these as a
goal (e.g., Sherman et al., 2009), we worded our items to simply describe the act of self-
reﬂection but not the goal, purpose or consequence of such thought. Thus the measure
asks, “when I feel threatened or anxious by people or events I ﬁnd myself . . .” (stem) “. . .
thinking about my values” (example item). The measure did not ask people to reﬂect on
the extent to which they respond in this way in order to achieve some goal or purpose.
To assess individual diﬀerences in chronic tendency to think positively about the self
we adapted the HINT (Verplanken et al., 2007) into the HIPT so that the items described
habitual positive rather than negative self-regard. To enhance the ability to compare
responses to the HIPT and spontaneous self-aﬃrmation items, we used the scale
employed in the HINT for both measures (1, disagree completely, 7, agree completely).
Our measure of trait self-esteem was the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965) due to its widespread use, simplicity of language, high level of reliability
(Baumeister, 1991), and relevance to previous work on the topic (e.g., Spencer et al., 1993).
Our conceptual and theoretical analysis led us to generate models testing the
following assumptions and hypotheses as part of our ﬁrst goal: (1) the items assessing
spontaneous self-aﬃrmation in response to threat will form three positively correlated
but distinct ﬁrst-order factors, (2) these three factors will load onto a single higher order
factor, indicating a general tendency to self-aﬃrm in response to threat, (3) these items
and the HIPT items will form positively correlated but nevertheless distinct scales, (4)
both new scales will be positively correlated with trait self-esteem, but – given the focus
of its items on the accessibility of positive self-thoughts – the HIPT scale will be more
strongly associated with trait self-esteem than will the SSAM, and (5) the SSAM subscale
measuring the tendency to report reﬂecting upon strengths, abilities and attributes will
be more strongly related to the trait self-esteem and HIPT scales than will those
measuring reﬂection upon values or social relations.
In two preliminary studies (see supplemental materials for details) we examined the
initial 14-item SSAM and the initial 12-item HIPT using exploratory and conﬁrmatory
factor analysis in a sample of 850 British students.2 Following this preliminary examina-
tion and initial test of hypotheses 1–5, 10 items were retained from the initial SSAM draft
items and 11 items were retained from the initial HIPT draft items.3 The resultant
measures were tested for temporal stability in a separate sample. Scores on the
higher-order SSAM (.76) and the HIPT (.86) were quite stable over a time period of
1–2 months. Furthermore, this level of stability was not determined by shared variance
with self-esteem, as the stability coeﬃcients barely changed (SSAM [.70] and HIPT [.71])
when self-esteem was partialled out of the time 1 and time 2 scores.
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As a ﬁnal step in the development process, to bolster the social relations SSAM factor
three additional items were generated and the item “thinking about my family and
friends” was split into two items measuring family and friends separately, yielding a total
of 14 items across the three subscales. We also created a short version of the HIPT
comprising the ﬁve highest loading items as assessed in the pilot study; these items are
presented in Table 1. This set of items was then subject to analysis in Study 1.
Study 1
Method
Participants were recruited for the study by email and through a social networking site
at a UK university. As an incentive, they were entered into a lottery with a chance of
winning £100 (then equivalent to approximately US$150) for completing the study.
Details of the sample are in Table 2.
Results and discussion
In a preliminary item screening step, one item meant to load on the Social Relations
factor (“thinking about the people who believe in me”) had a high cross-correlation with
items meant to load on the Strengths factor and hence was deleted from the scale,
leaving a 13-item total SSAM scale, with 4 items deﬁning the Strengths factor, 4 items
deﬁning the Values factor, and 5 items deﬁning the Social Relations factor. Using
conﬁrmatory factor analysis, and replicating analyses conducted in the preliminary
studies, we ﬁrst ﬁt the SSAM as a higher-order single factor, with three sub-factors
representing the three sub-scales, and individual items loading on the relevant sub-scale
(see Table 1). The ﬁt of the model was improved by examining modiﬁcation indices and
allowing correlated errors between the most highly related scale items, in this case item
7* (thinking about what I stand for) and 15* (thinking about what I believe in). The ﬁrst
column of Table 1 presents item loadings, test statistics, and sub-scale loadings when
the SSAM scale was modeled in isolation. This initial model ﬁt acceptably, CFI = .99, and
RMSEA = .05 (χ2(60) = 124.73, p < .001) and, most importantly, ﬁt signiﬁcantly better
than a simple one-factor model with 13 loadings and the same correlated error
(χ2(66) = 2139.57, p < .001). Results presented in Table 1 show that loadings for the
individual items on the relevant SSAM sub-scale factors were all substantial (at least .76),
as were subscale loadings on the higher-order SSAM factor (Values, .85, Social relations,
.69, and Strengths, .66). The second column of Table 1 presents the output when the
one-factor 5-item HIPT measure is added to the higher-order SSAM CFA model. In this
model, the HIPT and higher-order SSAM were allowed to correlate, and a factor-level
correlated error was added between the Strengths sub-scale of the SSAM and the HIPT
factor to capture hypothesis 5 (that the HIPT and RSES will be associated more highly
with the Strengths sub-factor than with either of the other SSAM sub-factors). The SSAM
higher-order model and the shortened HIPT showed similarly good item loadings (at
least .76, see Table 1), and were moderately correlated with each other (.42); the
correlated error between the strengths sub-factor and the HIPT was also substantial
(.46). These analyses provide support for hypotheses 1 through 3 and 5. The third
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column of Table 1 shows the results of the CFA when the higher-order SSAM was related
to both the HIPT and the RSES: the higher-order SSAM was moderately correlated with
the RSES factor (.46) and the short HIPT was highly correlated with the RSES (.82) (all ps
< .001). This ﬁnal model is depicted in Figure 1. Again consistent with Hypothesis 5, the
correlated error between the Strengths sub-factor and the RSES was also substantial (.43,
p < .001), which indicates that the relation between the Strengths sub-factor and the
Table 1. Items, standardized factor loadings, path coeﬃcients and diagnostic statistics, Study 1.
Itema Factor SSAMb SSAM + HIPTc SSAM + HIPT + RSESd
1 thinking about my strengths STREN .77 .77 .77
9 thinking about the things I am good at STREN .90 .88 .89
10 thinking about the things I like about myself STREN .89 .89 .89
19 remembering things I have succeeded at STREN .80 .80 .80
3 thinking about my values VALUES .87 .87 .87
4 thinking about my principles VALUES .88 .88 .88
6 thinking about what I stand for VALUES .93 .93 .93
18 thinking about the things I believe in VALUES .84 .84 .84
5 thinking about the people who are important to me SOCREL .91 .91 .91
7 thinking about my family SOCREL .81 .81 .81
8 thinking about my friends SOCREL .85 .85 .85
15 thinking about the people I love SOCREL .91 .91 .91
17 thinking about the people I trust SOCREL .76 .76 .77
1 I do automatically HIPT .92 .93
2 that feels sort of natural to me HIPT .94 .95
3 I do without further thinking HIPT .90 .89
4 I would ﬁnd hard not to do HIPT .78 .77
5 that’s typically “me” HIPT .90 .89
1 do things as well as most other people RSES .54
2 person of worth RSES .73
3 feel useless at times RSES −.54
4 positive attitude to self RSES .85
5 at times think I’m no good RSES −.59
6 satisﬁed with myself RSES .74
7 number of good qualities RSES .66
8 not much to be proud of RSES −.55
9 wish more respect for myself RSES −.56
10 inclined to feel a failure RSES −.73
χ2 124.73 235.89 557.70
df 60 128 336
NFIe .97 .96 .94
CFIf .99 .98 .97
RMSEAg .05 .05 .04
Path coeﬃcientsh
Path a SSAM to HIPT .42 .42
Path b SSAM to RSES .46
Path c HIPT to RSES .82
Path d Values .85 .85 .85
Path e Social relations .69 .69 .69
Path f Strengths .66 .66 .66
Path g uStren to HIPT .46 .46
Path h uStren to RSES .43
Values to Relationsi .55
Values to Strengthsi .56
Relations to Strengthsi .45
Note. N = 387. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure; HIPT = Habitual Index of Positive Thinking;
RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; STREN = SSAM strengths & attributes; VALUES = SSAM values & principles;
SOCREL = SSAM social relationships. aItem number in questionnaire. bSSAM higher order single-factor model. cSSAM
higher order single-factor model plus single-factor HIPT. dSSAM higher order single-factor model plus single-factor
HIPT plus single-factor RSES; all models with correlated errors. eNormed Fit Index. fComparative Fit Index. gRoot Mean
Square Error of Approximation. hPaths in Figure 1: a to c are inter-trait correlations, paths d to f are factor loadings,
paths g and h are factor-level correlated errors. iLatent correlations.
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RSES cannot be explained simply by the correlation between the overall higher-order
SSAM factor and the RSES, taking into account the diﬀerential reliability of the three
SSAM factors. A further (and simpler) test of Hypothesis 5 is to compare the factor-level
latent correlations between the RSE and Strengths factor (.62) with the correlation
between the RSE and Social Relations factor (.31) and that between the RSE and
Table 2. Studies contributing ﬁndings to sections 2 and 3.
Study 1. Participants were recruited for the study by email and through a social networking site at a UK university. As
an incentive, they were entered into a lottery with a chance of winning £100 (then equivalent to approximately US
$150) for completing the study. They completed a battery of measures, including the three core measures (SSAM,
HIPT and RSES), online. Demographic measures included sex, age, ethnicity and occupation. Overall, 387
participants completed all the measures and were entered into the analyses. Of these 248 (64.1%) were female.
The participants ranged in age from 18 to 69 years (M = 23.6 years, SD = 8.13) and most (87%) were students. This
sample contributes measures to both sections.
Study 2. Participants were undergraduate business students at a Canadian university who completed the measures,
including the three core measures, online for bonus course credit as part of a subject pool (N = 202, 69% female;
M = 21.8 years, SD = 4.43). Participants reported being raised primarily in Canada (n = 104, 52%) or China (n = 43,
21%). This sample contributes measures to both sections.
Study 3. Participants were two samples of second year undergraduate psychology students at a UK university who
completed a battery of measures, including the three core measures, as a ﬁller task during an interlude in a
scheduled practical class (combined sample, N = 218, 85% female; M = 19.89 years, SD = 1.09). Sample 1 (N = 95,
85% female; M = 20.0 years, SD = 1.3) completed the 17-item version of the SSAM (see Preliminary Study 2 in
supplemental materials); Sample 2 (N = 123, 85% female; M = 19.81 years, SD = 0.93) completed the ﬁnal 19-item
version. This sample contributes to Section 3.
Study 4. Participants (N = 198) were a community sample who completed the measures, including the three core
measures, online. They were recruited for the study by a commercial online survey sampling organization and paid
$15 as an incentive. Recruitment was targeted to achieve equal numbers of males and females. They ranged in
age from 25 to 45 years (M = 34.2 years, SD = 6.05). Most described having being raised primarily in Canada
(n = 181, 91%). This sample contributes to Section 2.a
Note. Each of these studies also contributes measures to the Additional Findings section of the supplemental materials.
a Study 4 also contributes to Section 4.
Figure 1. The ﬁnal three-trait model, showing relations among the ﬁrst-order and higher-order
factors. Coeﬃcients for paths denoted a-h can be found in Table 1 for Study 1 and for other studies
can be found in tables in supplemental materials. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure;
HIPT = Habitual Index of Positive Thinking; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; U = unique residual
variance.
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Values factor (.41) – as predicted, the ﬁrst correlation is signiﬁcantly stronger than either
of the other two (p’s < .001). These analyses therefore support hypotheses 4 and 5.
Overall, Study 1 therefore provided support for hypotheses 1 through 5 (see also
preliminary study 1). It also conﬁrmed the factorial structure of the 13-item SSAM
(α = .93) and its independent identity from the short HIPT (α = .95) and the RSES
(α = .88). Thus, except where otherwise indicated, we use the 13-item SSAM and the
5-item HIPT as our standard measures in the studies we report.
Relations with individual diﬀerences and psychological function: rationale
and analysis strategy
In pursuit of goal 2, we have subjected these three core measures to a series of analyses
that explore their joint and unique (residual) contributions to variance in an extensive
set of other measures and outcomes. The primary aim of these analyses is to establish
how the core measures predict a range of outcomes and thereby to chart how the
qualities they assess, both together and independently, shape spontaneous self-aﬃrma-
tion. As noted, our interpretation is that the RSE and HIPT will be correlated with the
SSAM because the ﬁrst two measures assess resources that can be used by self-aﬃrma-
tion processes, but nonetheless we strive to show that the SSAM has unique incremental
predictive validity beyond the other two measures. In text here we report in detail
ﬁndings from ﬁve studies involving analyses of several key outcomes, including mea-
sures of reported responses to psychological threat (section 2), aspects of self-percep-
tion and self-function (section 3), and responses to health threats (section 4); many other
outcome variables are reported in supplemental materials (as additional ﬁndings).
Details of the samples in each study are in Table 2. The assumption underlying these
tests is that the core measures will predict such state measures in the absence of an
explicit threat because people are chronically sensitive to self-integrity threats, which are
experienced as pervasive.
We begin the analysis of each study with a CFA testing our assumptions about the
model illustrated in Figure 1, thereby undertaking repeated conﬁrmatory testing of the
model across studies. (See each study’s supplemental materials for details.)
To evaluate the relative contributions of the measures to each outcome, we
examined zero-order correlations and then ran “competitive” simultaneous regression
analyses using structural equation modelling (SEM) to assess the strength of predic-
tion by each factor controlling for its associations with the others. Our hypotheses
therefore address both correlations and unique (residual) predictions. They are based
on (a) the premise that spontaneous self-aﬃrmation enables people to avoid defen-
sive responses to threat and (b) evidence of, or assumptions about, the extent to
which each outcome is associated with positive self-regard. We therefore hypothesize
that there will be outcomes with which the SSAM will initially correlate but will not
predict, because the relationship concerned is primarily a consequence of shared
variance with self-esteem rather than one that is unique to responding to threat with
self-aﬃrmation, but that there will also be many outcomes that the SSAM will predict
independently.
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Section 2: measures of responsiveness to threat and to risk information
Self-aﬃrmation is one of a range of possible responses to psychological threats (Gilbert,
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). In three studies we tested how the core
measures predict responses to scales assessing characteristic ways of responding to
threat and risk information.
In their Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Strategies Scale, Hepper and collea-
gues (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; Hepper, Sedikides, & Cai, 2013) diﬀerenti-
ate the four principal ways of responding to psychological threat: a form of reactive
self-aﬃrmation labeled self-aﬃrming reﬂections (deﬁned as “cognitive strategies that
involve self-aﬃrmation after threat and temporal comparisons”, p. 803), two self-
enhancing strategies that promote self-protection, positivity embracement (“seeking
out positive feedback . . . and capitalizing on it”, p. 804) and favorable construals
(“cognitive strategies that serve to construe the world and self-relevant events in
self-ﬂattering ways”, p. 803), and ﬁnally defensiveness (“cognitive and behavioral
strategies that aim to avoid, minimize and reduce the self-relevance of negative
feedback and threat”, p. 804). Hepper et al. (2010) found that their self-aﬃrming
reﬂections scale was not correlated with defensiveness; otherwise, the strategies were
moderately positively inter-correlated.
The Threat Orientation Scale (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008) identiﬁes four individual
diﬀerences in responses to threat that diﬀer in their implications for open-minded
processing and responsive – rather than defensive – action. In particular, the model
diﬀerentiates a control-based orientation, which is an action-oriented approach that
leads people to “take appropriate actions to reduce the risk”, from the denial-based
orientations of optimistic denial and avoidance denial, which entail “being overly
optimistic about risks, and . . . motivates people to deny or minimize their risk”. The
fourth orientation is heightened sensitivity, which involves an anxious sensitivity to risk
and is “associated with overestimating one’s risk, even when preventative measures
have been taken” (all quotes from Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008, p. 1071).
The Risk Information Seeking and Processing Model Scale (R. J. Griﬃn et al., 2002)
operationalizes the distinction between more analytical and in-depth or systematic
processing and more superﬁcial or heuristic processing of risk information.
We hypothesized that the SSAM would correlate positively with and also residually
(and positively) predict self-aﬃrming reﬂections, control-based optimism, and systematic
processing. The SSAM has conceptual overlap with self-aﬃrming reﬂections, control-
based optimism reﬂects optimism rooted in realistic appraisals rather than denial, and
the desire to embrace information and understand it often encourages systematic
processing (R. J. Griﬃn et al., 2002).
We hypothesized that the SSAM would correlate positively with, but not residually
predict, positivity embracement, favorable construals, and optimistic denial, primarily
because we hypothesize that these responses reﬂect self-esteem needs.
We predicted that the SSAM would not be positively correlated with or residually
predict defensiveness, heightened sensitivity, avoidance denial, or heuristic processing.
We assume self-aﬃrmation enables people to avoid responses to threat that are driven
by defensiveness or by anxiety (including heightened sensitivity and avoidance denial)
and militates against the need to engage in superﬁcial information processing.
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Participants & measures
Participants were the samples in Studies 1 (N = 387), 2 (N = 202), and 4 (N = 198) (see
Table 2). In Study 1, the Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Strategies Scale (SESPSS,
Hepper et al., 2010) measured four strategies: defensiveness (18 items, α = .83; e.g.,
“When you do poorly at something, thinking it was due to the situation, not your ability”),
positivity embracement (10 items, α = .76; e.g., “Asking for feedback when you expect a
positive answer”), favorable construals, (6 items, α = .73; e.g., “Getting over the experience
of negative feedback quickly”), and self-aﬃrming reﬂections (6 items, α = .77; “Thinking of
how you have grown and improved over time”), using a 6-point response scale (1, not at all
characteristic of me, to 6, very characteristic of me). In Study 2, the short-form of the Threat
Orientation Scale (TOS, Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008) measured four orientations to threat
(5 items per scale): control based (α = .85; e.g., “When I hear my health is at risk, I try to
actively work to decrease my risk in order to alleviate my concerns”), optimistic denial
(α = .74; e.g., “I rarely think about bad things happening to me”), avoidance denial (α = .90;
e.g., “I would rather not hear about health or safety risks that may aﬀect me”), and
heightened sensitivity (α = .89; e.g., “I am the type of person who worries extensively over
a threatening situation”) using a 7-point response scale (1, not at all like me; 7, very much
like me). In Study 4, the Risk Information Seeking and Processing Model Scale (RISP, R. J. Griﬃn
et al., 2002) measured two processing styles: Systematic processing (5 items, α = .78; e.g.,
“After I encounter information about this topic, I am likely to stop and think about it”), and
Heuristic processing (4 items, α = .71; e.g., “When I see or hear information about this topic, I
rarely spend much time thinking about it”), using a 5-point response scale (1, Strongly
Disagree, 2, Disagree, 3, Feel Neutral, 4, Agree, 5, Strongly Agree).
Results
In each sample we established the model based on item analysis and model ﬁt (see each
study’s supplemental materials for relevant item tables) and undertook competitive SEM
analyses for the three core predictors (see Table 3 for the latent correlation and
regression coeﬃcients).
Self-enhancement and self-protection strategies
All core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with self-aﬃrming reﬂections, posi-
tivity embracement and favorable construals, but only the SSAM and the HIPT correlated
signiﬁcantly with defensiveness.4
In the SEM analyses, the SSAM signiﬁcantly (and strongly) predicted self-aﬃrming
reﬂections, but not the reported use of the other responses to threat. In contrast, the
HIPT did not predict self-aﬃrming reﬂections, but was a signiﬁcant positive predictor of
all other responses to threat. The RSES did not predict self-aﬃrming reﬂections, was a
positive predictor of the two self-enhancing strategies, and a marginally negative pre-
dictor of defensiveness (p = .057).
Threat orientation
All core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with control-based optimism. Only
the HIPT and RSES correlated signiﬁcantly with optimistic denial, and only the RSES with
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avoidance denial and heightened sensitivity. In the SEM regression models, the SSAM
predicted control-based optimism positively and optimistic denial negatively. The HIPT
predicted control-based optimism positively. The RSES predicted optimistic denial posi-
tively, heightened sensitivity and avoidance denial negatively, but did not predict
control-based optimism.
Risk information seeking and processing
All core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with systematic processing.
However, only the HIPT correlated signiﬁcantly with heuristic processing. In the SEM
regression models, the SSAM predicted systematic processing positively, as did the RSES,
but not heuristic processing. The HIPT predicted heuristic processing positively, whereas
the RSES predicted it negatively.
Discussion
The three core measures showed similar patterns of correlation with self-aﬃrming
reﬂections, positivity embracement, favorable construals, control-based optimism, and
Table 3. Responsiveness to threat and to risk information: Correlations and
standardized regression coeﬃcients.
SSAM HIPT RSES
Correlation coeﬃcients
SESPSS
Self-aﬃrming reﬂections .77*** .44*** .48***
Defensiveness .14* .17*** .05
Positivity embracement .36*** .36*** .36***
Favorable construals .60*** .67*** .69***
Threat Orientation
Control-based optimism .45*** .35*** .37***
Optimistic denial −.02 .22** .24**
Avoidance denial −.13 −.11 −.36***
Heightened sensitivity .04 −.06 −.20*
RISP
Systematic .28*** .21** .29***
Heuristic .06 .21** −.08
SEM coeﬃcients
SESPSS
Self-aﬃrming reﬂections .63*** .08 .13
Defensiveness .03 .42*** −.21^
Positivity embracement .09 .24* .20*
Favorable construals .09^ .32*** .40***
Threat Orientation
Control-based optimism .31*** .22** .14
Optimistic denial −.19* .15^ .26*
Avoidance denial .06 .09 −.45***
Heightened sensitivity .16^ .06 −.30**
RISP
Systematic .19* −.06 .22*
Heuristic .05 .69*** −.54***
Notes. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure; HIPT = Habitual Index of Positive
Thinking; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. SESPSS = Self-Enhancement and Self-
Protection Strategies Scale (Hepper et al., 2010). Threat Orientation = short-form of the
Threat Orientation Scale (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008). RISP = Risk Information Seeking
and Processing Model (RISP) (R. J. Griﬃn et al., 2002). The core measures are latent variables;
the outcome variables are summary scores.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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systematic processing, but not with defensiveness, the remaining forms of threat orien-
tation, or heuristic processing. However, controlling for self-esteem and the tendency to
automatic positive self-thought measured by the HIPT revealed that those high in SSAM
tended to favor self-aﬃrming rather than the other strategies of response to psycholo-
gical threats, to face the future with control-based optimism rather than optimistic
denial, and to process information systematically. Thus, controlling for these elements
has revealed distinctive elements, obscured at the level of association, that appear to be
intrinsic to the self-aﬃrmation response to threat. It is notable that core self-aﬃrmation,
stripped of self-esteem, appears to be associated with more systematic processing; this
is consistent with assumptions underlying much experimental work using self-aﬃrma-
tion manipulations with health-risk information (e.g., Epton et al., 2015).
Overall, the ﬁndings were largely consistent with predictions, with two exceptions.
The SSAM did not correlate with optimistic denial and predicted it negatively when the
other measures were included, in contrast to our prediction that it would correlate with
optimistic denial positively but not predict it, suggesting we overestimated the size of
the relationship between self-esteem and optimistic denial. The SSAM correlated posi-
tively with defensiveness. This appears to stem from a positive correlation between
strengths and defensiveness (.29, p < .001), perhaps indicating a possible negative
outcome of focusing on strengths as a source of self-aﬃrmation (see Study 1 supple-
mental materials). However, consistent with hypothesis, in SEM analyses the SSAM did
not predict defensiveness.
Overall, the studies reveal evidence of relationships that are distinctive to the ten-
dency to report responding to threats by self-aﬃrming and that are consistent with
spontaneous self-aﬃrmation being characterized by non-defensive, control-based and
systematic responding to threats.
Section 3: measures of self-perception and self-function
Little is known about how spontaneous self-aﬃrmation relates to, and is inﬂuenced by,
self-perception, self-structure, and self-function. To help redress this situation, we report
the ﬁndings from three studies testing how the core measures correlate with, and
predict, measures of ﬁve self-related variables. Of these, two – self-concept clarity and
implicit self-esteem – have been hypothesized to be potential mediators of experimental
self-aﬃrmation eﬀects and one – self-compassion – overlaps conceptually with both self-
esteem and self-aﬃrmation. The others – “cognitive self-aﬃrmation inclination” (CSAI,
Pietersma & Dikstra, 2012) and self-integrity (as measured by the self-integrity scale [SIS],
Sherman et al., 2009) – are conceptually closely related to the SSAM. As detailed below,
we hypothesized that the SSAM would correlate positively with and also residually
predict all but implicit self-esteem (which it would correlate with positively but not
predict).
Self-concept clarity refers to the extent to which self-beliefs are “clearly and con-
ﬁdently deﬁned, internally consistent, and stable” (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 141). Implicit
self-esteem has been deﬁned as “a global self-evaluation that people are unable or
unwilling to report” (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann Jr., 2011, p. 366). Both self-concept
clarity and implicit self-esteem have been proposed as potential mediators of self-
aﬃrmation processes (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Consequently, we were interested in
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establishing the extent to which the correlation between the SSAM and each of these
perceptions (which we hypothesized would be positive) is a product of shared variance
with the HIPT and RSES. Our hypothesis was that self-clarity would be associated with
more thoughtful and open-minded self-appraisal and so would be residually and posi-
tively predicted by the SSAM; however, we hypothesized that any apparent relationship
between the SSAM and implicit self-esteem would be a product of self-esteem needs
and that the SSAM would therefore not residually predict it.
Self-compassion is an “emotionally positive self-attitude” (Neﬀ, 2003, p. 85) that is
considered to lack the negative qualities of extremely high self-esteem (see Neﬀ, 2011,
for a review). Self-compassion addresses how individuals respond to negative experi-
ences and threats and, therefore, overlaps conceptually with both self-aﬃrmation and
self-esteem. However, while much has been written about its relationship with self-
esteem, little is known about how it relates to self-aﬃrmation. We proposed that the
SSAM will be positively correlated with self-compassion (as measured by the Self-
Compassion Scale, SCS, Neﬀ, 2003) and would residually predict it, along with several
SCS subscales: Because self-aﬃrmation should encourage balanced and open-minded
appraisal, we hypothesized that the SSAM would positively predict both the self-kind-
ness and self-judgment subscales; based on experimental ﬁndings showing self-aﬃrma-
tion encourages self-transcendence (e.g., Burson et al., 2012), we hypothesized the SSAM
would also positively predict the common humanity subscale.
Like the SSAM, the CSAI scale is designed to assess individual diﬀerences in self-
aﬃrmation; however, unlike the SSAM, the CSAI embodies an assumption that this
tendency reﬂects a stable trait and the measure has been explicitly designed to correlate
with self-esteem. We hypothesized that the SSAM would be positively correlated with
and also positively predict the CSAI. However, inspection of the CSAI items led us also to
hypothesize that the CSAI would relate most closely to the SSAM strengths and attri-
butes factor. Accordingly, we report here also the SEM analyses in which we tested how
the three SSAM ﬁrst-order factors predicted the CSAI (before and after controlling for the
HIPT and RSES). Of the SSAM ﬁrst-order factors we hypothesized that the CSAI would be
predicted uniquely by SSAM strengths.
The concept of self-integrity lies at the heart of Steele’s (1988) analysis, so naturally
we were interested in the extent to which the core measures predicted scores on an
attempt to operationalize this concept (the SIS). We therefore hypothesized that the
SSAM would positively correlate with, and also uniquely predict, the SIS.
Participants & measures
Participants are described in Table 2. In Study 1 (N = 387) we measured self-concept clarity,
implicit self-esteem and self-compassion. In Study 2 (N = 202) wemeasured CSAI. In Study 3
(N = 218) we measured self-integrity. The Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996)
measures self-clarity (12-items, α = .87; e.g. “I seldom experience conﬂict between the
diﬀerent aspects of my personality”) using a 7-point scale (1, Strongly disagree, 7; Strongly
agree). The Full-Name Name-Liking measure of implicit self-esteem (Gebauer, Riketta,
Broemer, & Maio, 2008) uses a single item: “How much do you LIKE your name, in total?”
with a 10-point response scale (1, not at all; 10, very much). The SCS (Neﬀ, 2003) measures
overall self-compassion (α = .84) derived from six subscales: Self-kindness (5 items, α = .83;
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e.g., “I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling emotional pain”), self-judgment (5
items, α = .79; e.g., “I’m disapproving and judgmental about my own ﬂaws and inadequa-
cies”), common humanity (4 items, α = .81; e.g., “I try to see my failings as part of the human
condition”), isolation (4 items, α = .79; e.g., “When I think about my inadequacies, it tends to
make me feel more separate and cut oﬀ from the rest of the world”), mindfulness (4 items,
α = .76; e.g., “When something upsets me I try to keep my emotions in balance”), and over-
identiﬁcation (4 items, α = .77; e.g., “When I’m feeling down I tend to obsess and ﬁxate on
everything that’s wrong”). Responses are given on 6-point scale (1, Almost never; 6, Almost
always). The Cognitive Self-Aﬃrmation Inclination Scale (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) measures
the inclination to use “positive self-images”when the self is threatened (6 items, α = .81; e.g.,
“I notice I do some things very well”), using a 5-point response scale (1, never, 5, very often).
The SIS (Sherman et al., 2009) is designed to assess the feeling of “general moral and
adaptive adequacy” (8 items, α = .86: e.g., “I have the ability and skills to deal with whatever
comes my way”), using a 7-point response scale (1, strongly disagree, 3, disagree, 5, agree, 7,
strongly agree).
Results
As previously, in each study, having established the model based on item analysis and
model ﬁt, we undertook competitive SEM analyses (see Table 4 for the latent correlation
and regression coeﬃcients).
Self-concept clarity and implicit self-esteem
All core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with self-concept clarity, but only the
HIPT and RSES correlated signiﬁcantly with implicit self-esteem, both positively. In the
SEM analyses the RSES was the sole signiﬁcant predictor of either self-concept clarity or
name-liking.
Self-compassion
All core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with self-compassion. In the SEM
analysis the SSAM had a signiﬁcant unique relationship with self-compassion, the RSES
was a strong predictor, and the HIPT showed no unique relationship. We also examined
the patterns of predictions for the six component subscales of self-compassion. The
SSAM positively predicted all positive subscales plus the negative self-judgment sub-
scale. The RSES positively predicted all positive subscales and negatively predicted all
negative subscales. The HIPT did not predict any subscale.
Cognitive self-aﬃrmation inclination (CSAI)
All three core measures correlated positively with the CSAI and predicted it positively in
SEM analyses. Of the ﬁrst-order SSAM factors, only strengths was a signiﬁcant predictor
(.57) in SEM analyses, notably remaining signiﬁcant (.35) even with the inclusion of the
HIPT and RSES (all p < .001).
The self-integrity scale (SIS)
All three core measures correlated signiﬁcantly positively with overall SIS. SEM analyses
revealed the RSES to be the sole (and a strong) predictor. However, exploratory factor
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analysis indicated that the SIS comprises three ﬁrst-order factors, assessing competence
(3 items, e.g., “on the whole I’m a capable person”, α = .79), morality (3 items, e.g., “I feel
that I’m basically a moral person”, α = .81), and completeness (2 items, e.g., “ . . . I feel a
sense of completeness about who I fundamentally am”, α = .86). All core measures
correlated signiﬁcantly positively with each factor (see Table 4). In SEM analyses, how-
ever, the SSAM signiﬁcantly positively predicted morality, whereas the RSES signiﬁcantly
positively predicted competence and completeness.
Discussion
Overall, this set of analyses has added to our understanding of spontaneous self-
aﬃrmation by revealing how the core measures correlate with and predict ﬁve distinct
aspects of self-perception and function. The three core measures showed similar
Table 4. Measures of self-perception and function: correlations and standardized regression
coeﬃcients.
SSAM HIPT RSES
Correlation coeﬃcients
Self-concept clarity .24*** .31*** .43***
Implicit self-esteem (Full-name liking scale) .09 .16*** .23***
Self-Compassion Scale & subscales
Overall self-compassion .55*** .57*** .70***
Self-kindness .54*** .47*** .53***
Self-judgment −.21*** −.46*** −.53***
Common humanity .60*** .34*** .44***
Isolation −.27*** −.40*** −.52***
Mindfulness .49*** .36*** .47***
Over-identiﬁcation −.25*** −.39*** −.52***
Cognitive self-aﬃrmation inclination .58*** .45*** .62***
Self-integrity Scale
Overall self-integrity .58*** .64*** .91***
Competence .54*** .53*** .81***
Completeness .46*** .62*** .81***
Morality .40*** .23** .37***
SEM coeﬃcients
Self-concept clarity −.001 −.12 .55***
Implicit self-esteem (Full-name liking scale) −.07 −.05 .33**
Self-Compassion Scale & subscales
Overall self-compassion .14** .001 .66***
Self-kindness .25*** .10 .37***
Self-judgment .16** −.14 −.53***
Common humanity .44*** −.09 .34***
Isolation .06 .004 −.58***
Mindfulness .28*** −.06 .43***
Over-identiﬁcation .08 .04 −.63***
Cognitive self-aﬃrmation inclination .27*** .19** .42***
Self-integrity Scale
Overall self-integrity .02 .02 .87***
Competence .08 −.07 .81***
Completeness −.09 .13 .77***
Morality .30** −.09 .25^
Notes. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure; HIPT = Habitual Index of Positive Thinking; RSES = Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale. Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996). Full-Name Name-Liking measure of implicit self-
esteem (Gebauer et al., 2008). Self-Compassion Scale (Neﬀ, 2003). Cognitive Self-Aﬃrmation Inclination Scale
(Pietersma & Dikstra, 2012). The Self-Integrity Scale (Sherman et al., 2009). The core measures are latent variables;
the outcome variables are summary scores.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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patterns of correlation with four of the ﬁve outcome measures, but diverse and some-
times divergent relationships in the competitive SEM analyses. The SSAM correlated
(positively) with self-clarity, self-compassion, the SIS and CSAI, but not name-liking
(implicit self-esteem). Controlling for the HIPT and RSES revealed that the SSAM inde-
pendently predicted self-compassion, self-judgment, CSAI, and the morality factor of the
SIS, but not overall SIS or self-clarity. Thus controlling for these elements has again
revealed elements distinctive to the self-aﬃrmation response that are obscured at the
level of association and are consistent with responding to the self with both compassion
and self-judgment.
The ﬁndings were again largely in accordance with predictions. However, contrary to
prediction, the SSAM did not correlate with name-liking; more notably, it correlated
positively with, but did not predict, self-clarity or scores on the SIS. The failure to predict
self-clarity is potentially inconsistent with the idea that self-clarity is a mediator of self-
aﬃrmation eﬀects.5 The failure to predict the SIS results from the high correlation
between overall SIS and trait self-esteem. Indeed, when the SIS was decomposed into
three sub-factors (following EFA), the SSAM uniquely predicted the morality factor,
whereas the RSES signiﬁcantly predicted the other two factors (competence and com-
pleteness), suggesting the original hypothesis was insuﬃciently reﬁned.
Perhaps most striking was support for the hypothesis that the SSAM would positively
predict self-judgment, one of the negative self-compassion sub-scales. This ﬁnding is
consistent with assumptions about the role of self-aﬃrmation in promoting open-
minded self-appraisal without undermining self-regard.
Additional ﬁndings
Space precludes detailed reporting in the body of this paper of the analyses we have
conducted of relationships between the SSAM, HIPT and RSES and a large number of
other measures; comprehensive details are presented in the Additional Findings sections
of the supplemental materials. These diverse outcome measures include scales assessing
self-esteem and self-worth; identity, self-presentation and self-evaluation; defensiveness
vs openness; future orientation; approach, avoidance and coping; risk perception and
risk behavior; health beliefs and behavior; emotions, stress, and well-being; resources
and resilience; and personality. These analyses extend the ﬁndings in two ways: by
providing additional measures of variables related to those reported in the body of this
paper (e.g., measures of defensiveness vs openness, of self-esteem and self-worth) and
by extending what is measured (e.g., measures of future orientation, of personality).
Overall, the SSAM had small-to-medium positive correlations with social and virtue-
based contingencies of self-worth, adaptive coping strategies and positive emotions,
and negative relationships with behavioral inhibition, negative emotions, and maladap-
tive coping strategies. It was not correlated with aspects of self-worth such as appear-
ance or approval-based contingencies of self-worth, the self-enhancement motive,
unstable self-esteem, or the narcissistic personality. Of note, many relationships
remained signiﬁcant in analyses of partial correlations or SEM latent variable regression
analyses controlling for shared variance among the core measures (see Additional
Findings supplemental materials), suggesting both that there are many elements that
are distinctive to responding to threats by reportedly self-aﬃrming and indicating
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something of the breadth of its correlates. Tests also indicated that the SSAM and RSES
often diﬀered in the strength of their zero-order correlations (see Additional Findings
supplemental materials). Overall, the tendency to be higher in SSAM appears to be less
associated with aspects of evaluation, control, and distance from negative cognition and
emotion than is the tendency to be higher in trait self-esteem; when stripped of self-
esteem tendency, these aspects of spontaneous self-aﬃrmation are clearly revealed.
Section 4: predicting responses to health threats
In the ﬁnal two studies we assess how spontaneous self-aﬃrmation predicts responses
to information that potentially challenges self-integrity. In particular, we examine
responses to two health threats: the risks of acrylamide in food (Study 4) and of
insuﬃcient fruit and vegetable consumption (Study 5). Health threats have been widely
used in experimental work on self-aﬃrmation and have provided a reliable test bed in
which to assess predictions derived from Self-Aﬃrmation Theory (Cohen & Sherman,
2014). Using health as the focal threat also enabled us to employ outcome measures
from experimental work, thus enabling direct comparisons with ﬁndings in the experi-
mental literature.
In these studies we explore the correlates and predictions of the SSAM and the HIPT
controlling for two diﬀerent ways of assessing self-regard: trait self-esteem (Study 4) and
self-compassion (Study 5).
Study 4: defensive versus open-minded responding
In Study 4 we tested how the core measures predicted processing of, and response to,
potentially threatening information. Participants read a U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) brochure about the risks of ingesting the chemical acrylamide
from fried and baked food. To assess defensive versus open-minded responding we
used a set of dependent measures employed in research in related experimental work
on self-aﬃrmation (D. W. Griﬃn & Harris, 2011) that investigated another relatively novel
message (about mercury in tuna). Drawing from this, and other experimental work, we
hypothesized that the SSAM would be correlated with and positively predict more
thoughtful and aﬀectively engaged responding, signifying more open-minded proces-
sing, as indicated by ratings of greater depth of thought about the information and
higher message acceptance, perceived personal relevance, vulnerability, and reported
negative aﬀect. We also tested for interactive eﬀects between the SSAM and RSES and
between the SSAM and consumption. The former tests reveal whether the inclination to
respond to threat with self-aﬃrmation is most successful in reducing defensiveness for
those with more self-esteem resources to draw upon; the latter enabled us to test
whether the inclination to respond to threat with self-aﬃrmation was most successful
in reducing defensiveness among those for whom the message was most relevant and
who were thus most likely to be defensive, as has been sometimes found in experi-
mental work (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005).
The study included an experimental component: After completing the core measures,
but before reading the brochure, participants were randomized to one of three condi-
tions: a control, a standard, or a novel “embedded”, self-aﬃrmation condition.6 Inclusion
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of these self-aﬃrmation manipulations principally enabled us to test our hypothesis that
the SSAM would predict open-minded responses to threat independently of self-aﬃrma-
tion condition, suggesting that individuals who are prone to spontaneously self-aﬃrm
will do so whether they are instructed to or not. We also tested for interactions between
the SSAM and condition, to see if the manipulation particularly beneﬁtted those low in
SSAM, and for any main eﬀect of condition.7
Method
The study was introduced as a “food and personality” study in three sections. The ﬁrst
(on “personality and habits”) contained the measures of consumption, demographics
and individual diﬀerences, including the core measures and RISP. The second presented
the manipulation and brochure. The third contained the dependent measures. Some
questions (e.g., about attitudes towards various consumer products) do not form part of
the current study and are not reported here. Participants completed the measures online
in the sequence described below. Sample details are in Table 2.
Participants
Participants (N = 198) were a community sample who completed the measures online.
They ranged in age from 25 to 45 years (M = 34.2 years, SD = 6.05). Most described
having being raised primarily in Canada (n = 181, 91%). Further details are in Table 2.
Initial measures
After giving consent, participants indicated their age, gender, cultural background and
the country in which they were “primarily raised”. They then answered items about their
consumption of a variety of food items, including potato chips and French fries; “How
often do you eat . . . ?” (1, Never; 5, More than once a week). Consumption was calculated
as the mean consumption of chips and fries. Next followed the core measures (including
the RISP, see Table 3).
Self-Aﬃrmation manipulation and acrylamide brochure
Participants were randomized to one of three conditions: a standard self-aﬃrmation
essay task used in previous studies (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005) in which they wrote
about their most important value before reading the brochure; an embedded self-
aﬃrmation condition, in which they were invited to think about one of the three sources
of self-aﬃrmation in the SSAM while reading the brochure; or a no-task control condi-
tion, in which they were taken straight to the brochure. Further details of the embedded
manipulation can be found in the Study 4 supplemental materials.
Next, all participants were provided with a link to an online pdf of a U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) brochure entitled “Information on Acrylamide, Diet, and Food
Storage and Preparation” (FDA, 2008). The brochure described acrylamide, oﬀered
advice on diet, and tips for consumers to reduce levels of acrylamide (e.g., by reducing
French fries and potato chip consumption).
Indices of defensive versus open-minded responding to the message
All measures were based on those in D. W. Griﬃn and Harris (2011). Responses were
given on 7-point scales. Depth of thought was assessed by two items (“I thought
SELF AND IDENTITY 21
about the risk of acrylamide to my body”; “I thought deeply about the information”;
1, not at all, 7, very much; α = .81). Personal relevance was assessed by two items
(“The content of the brochure was relevant to me”; 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly
agree; “The target audience of the brochure is”, 1, not similar to me, 7, very similar to
me; α = .79). Average other relevance was assessed by the item “The content of the
brochure was relevant to the average survey respondent of my age and sex” (1,
strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree). Negative aﬀect was assessed by ﬁve items (e.g.,
“I felt fearful while reading the brochure”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree;
α = .92). Personal risk and Average other risk respectively were assessed by the items
“How likely do you think you are [the average survey respondent of your age and sex
is] to suﬀer health eﬀects of acrylamide consumed in potato chips, French fries, and
other fried or browned foods?” (1, not at all likely, 7, extremely likely). Message
acceptance was assessed by ﬁve items (e.g., “The evidence linking the consumption
of deep-fried or roasted starchy foods with potentially cancer-causing acrylamide is”,
1, very weak; 7, very strong; α = .91).
Results
A table describing the model ﬁt statistics can be found in the Study 4 supplemental
materials. In this sample the SSAM ﬁrst-order factors had extremely high inter-correla-
tions (.72-.90) leading to very high loadings on the higher-order factor (with the loading
for values set at 1.0 to prevent out-of-range values).
Given the novelty of the message and the complexity of the factors inﬂuencing chip
and fries consumption, we did not form a hypothesis about the relationship between
the core measures and consumption. Nevertheless, for exploratory purposes we con-
ducted analyses. All core measures were correlated positively with consumption; how-
ever, there were no signiﬁcant predictors of consumption in the SEM analyses (see
Table 5).
Defensive versus open-minded responding
The SSAM correlated signiﬁcantly positively with all but the risk measures (Table 5) and,
in SEM analyses, positively predicted all dependent measures (being the sole signiﬁcant
predictor of depth of thought and the two relevance measures). The HIPT correlated
signiﬁcantly with some measures, positively predicting negative aﬀect and personal risk.
The RSES only correlated signiﬁcantly with consumption. It was a negative predictor of
message acceptance, negative aﬀect and risk perceptions.
Interaction analyses
We used regression analyses on the mean scale scores to examine the interactive eﬀects
of the SSAM with the RSES. First we computed cross-product terms between the mean-
centered SSAM scores and the mean-centered RSES scores. The main eﬀects for both the
SSAM and the RSES were consistent in sign and magnitude with those reported in the
SEM analyses above (see Study 4 supplemental materials). There were positive and
signiﬁcant or near-signiﬁcant interactions between SSAM and the RSES for depth of
thought (.17, p = .027), message acceptance (.16, p = .031), personal relevance (.15,
p = .044), relevance to others (.19, p = .014), personal risk (.14, p = .057), and average risk
(.19, p = .011). The direction of this set of interactions implied that the tendency for
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individuals higher in SSAM to be more accepting of the message was accentuated
among those also high in trait self-esteem.
Likewise, we computed cross-product terms between the mean-centered SSAM
scores and the mean-centered consumption scores to test the interactive eﬀects of
the SSAM with consumption of chips and fries. There were positive and signiﬁcant
interactions between SSAM and consumption for depth of thought (.17, p = .020),
personal relevance (.15, p = .029), and relevance for others (.17, p = .018). The direction
of this set of interactions implied that the tendency for individuals higher in SSAM to be
more accepting of the message was accentuated among those also high in threat-
relevance, as measured by consumption of chips and fries.
The SEM analyses reported above revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀects of manipulated self-
aﬃrmation on outcomes. To examine whether there was nonetheless evidence of
interactive eﬀects of the SSAM with the self-aﬃrmation manipulation, we computed
cross-product terms between the mean-centered SSAM scores and two contrast-coded
variables representing the three self-aﬃrmation manipulation conditions. No interaction
between the SSAM and the manipulation conditions approached signiﬁcance for any of
the dependent variables. Full details of these ﬁndings can be found in the Study 4
supplemental materials.
Discussion
In a community sample, and as hypothesized, the SSAM items predicted engagement
with, and uptake of, the message, even after controlling for trait self-esteem and
tendency to think positively about the self habitually and automatically. Indeed, the
SSAM predicted message processing and acceptance positively, in contrast to the RSES,
Table 5. Study 4. measures of defensive vs open-minded responding:
correlations and standardized regression coeﬃcients.
SSAM HIPT RSES
Correlation coeﬃcients
Consumptiona .15* .13* .19*
Depth of thought .28*** .15* .14^
Message acceptance .30*** .15* .05
Personal relevance .23** .04 .10
Other’s relevance .19* .09 .09
Negative aﬀect .23** .17* .003
Personal risk .11 .05 −.14
Other’s risk .12 .03 −.11
SEM coeﬃcients
Consumptiona .01 .06 .20
Depth of thought .33*** .04 −.11
Message acceptance .39*** .22^ −.34*
Personal relevance .32*** −.16 −.003
Other’s relevance .24** −.03 −.06
Negative aﬀect .32*** .36** −.46**
Personal risk .26** .36** −.54***
Other’s risk .28** .23^ −.45**
Notes. N = 198. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure; HIPT = Habitual Index of
Positive Thinking; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. SEM analyses include self-
aﬃrmation condition (1 = control, 2 = combined experimental). The core measures are
latent variables; the outcome variables are summary scores.
a Reported consumption of potato chips and fries.
^p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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which predicted them negatively. Thus the evidence suggests that the relationships
between the SSAM and these indices of more thoughtful, engaged and open-minded
responding do not simply reﬂect the relationship between the SSAM and trait self-
esteem but are indicative of something unique to the self-aﬃrmation response ten-
dency. Moreover, these eﬀects were obtained on the same set of message processing
and acceptance variables used by D. W. Griﬃn and Harris (2011) to investigate another
novel threat (mercury from tuna) using an experimental manipulation of self-aﬃrmation,
suggesting parallels between the consequences of being high in SSAM and completing
a self-aﬃrmation task.
Regression analyses revealed that the positive relationships between the SSAM and
measures of open-minded message processing were further accentuated for those
higher in self-esteem, suggesting that the inclination to respond to threat with self-
aﬃrmation is most successful in reducing defensiveness for those with more self-esteem
resources to draw upon. Of note, this implies that self-esteem may be complementary to
self-aﬃrmation as a route to reducing threats to the self.
The positive relationships between the SSAM and depth of thought and relevance
perceptions were also accentuated for those higher in consumption, suggesting that the
inclination to respond to threat with self-aﬃrmation was associated with greater mes-
sage engagement among those for whom the message was most likely to be relevant
and who were thus most likely to be defensive. It is notable that those higher in
consumption not only reported giving more thought to the message but also being
more accepting of its personal relevance; the latter is seen as a critical step in precaution
adoption (Weinstein, 1988) and echoes ﬁndings in the experimental literature (e.g.,
Harris & Napper, 2005).
It is important to note that these signiﬁcant relationships involving the SSAM
occurred in the absence of a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of the experimental manipulation,
thereby supporting our hypothesis that the SSAM would predict open-minded
responses to threat independently of self-aﬃrmation condition. Nor was there evidence
that the SSAM interacted with the manipulation. However, it is hard to interpret the
absence of interactive eﬀects given that the manipulation was in this instance unsuc-
cessful. Of course, there are many potential reasons why a manipulation may not work,
but it is important to note this failure, as the tendency in published work on self-
aﬃrmation is to report successful manipulations.
Overall, therefore, the SSAM predicted more open-minded responding to the infor-
mation. It was associated with a set of distinctive responses to the brochure – evident
despite controls for relationships between the SSAM, RSES and HIPT – indicating some-
thing core to the self-aﬃrmation response.
Study 5: motivation for behavior change
In study 5 we tested how the measures predicted readiness to change behavior follow-
ing a health threat. Participants responded to information about fruit and vegetable
consumption, a behavior that has been the subject of numerous studies using experi-
mental manipulations of self-aﬃrmation. In this study we employed a diﬀerent measure
of self-regard, replacing the RSES with a measure of self-compassion (the self-compas-
sion scale, SCS, Neﬀ, 2003). Self-compassion is positively correlated with trait self-esteem,
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but is considered to lack some of its negative implications (e.g., Neﬀ, 2011). Importantly,
like self-aﬃrmation, self-compassion has been shown to reduce defensiveness and help
promote successful self-regulation of health behavior (Sirois, Kitner, & Hirsch, 2014; Terry
& Leary, 2011; Terry, Leary, Mehta, & Henderson, 2013). Consequently, the SCS was a
useful measure alongside which to probe the predictive eﬀects of the SSAM, over-
lapping with self-esteem but comprising additional aspects of self-regard and providing
a stringent control variable for comparison purposes. In study 5, therefore, we tested the
implications of controlling for SCS for the predictive relationships of the SSAM.
Focusing on fruit and vegetable consumption enabled us to compare responses with
those in experimental studies (e.g., Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris et al., 2014; Napper,
Harris, & Klein, 2014; Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2011) using a message employed in several of
those studies (e.g., Harris et al., 2014). It also enabled us to test the relation between the
core measures and baseline behavior for a dietary goal that people typically under-
achieve relative to guidelines, despite being aware of those guidelines and accepting
that consumption is beneﬁcial (e.g., Centers for Disease Control & Prevention; CDC, 2013;
NHS Information Centre, Lifestyles Statistics, 2012). Based on ﬁndings from the experi-
mental literature we predicted that the SSAM would be positively associated with fruit
and vegetable consumption.
We used a range of measures to assess the impact of the message, including some
based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991), which has been widely used
to model health behavior change (McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011) and
applied in some experimental work on self-aﬃrmation (e.g., Cooke, Trebaczyk, Harris,
& Wright, 2014; Harris & Napper, 2005; Jessop, Simmonds, & Sparks, 2009). To the two-
factor TPB (e.g., Conner, Hugh-Jones, & Berg, 2011) we added measures of (a) moral
norms (Godin, Bélanger-Gravel, Vézina-Im, Amireault, & Bilodeau, 2012), given the cen-
trality of values to much of the research on self-aﬃrmation, and (b) the reasons people
consider when thinking about why to change, drawn from Behavioral Reasoning Theory
(BRT, Westaby, 2005). Consistent with our assumptions about the association between
spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and reduced defensiveness, we predicted that the SSAM
would be associated with, and predict, less defensive responses to the message as
indexed by more positive responses to the TPB and moral norm and BRT measures.
To further probe open-mindedness versus defensiveness, we also measured the
extent to which participants engaged in denial of personal relevance and the use of
self-exempting beliefs in response to the message (Thompson, Robbins, Payne, &
Castillo, 2011) and whether they derogated the message or showed evidence of mes-
sage-related anger as an index of emotional reactance to it (see Gardner, 2010). We
predicted that the SSAM would negatively correlate with, and predict less, denial,
message derogation and anger.
As in study 4 (and for similar reasons) we tested for interactive eﬀects between the
SSAM and SCS and between the SSAM and consumption. To provide a further test of
the capacity of the SSAM to predict responses to the threat materials independently,
the study again included a self-aﬃrmation vs control condition, and we again tested
for main eﬀects of condition and the SSAM x condition interaction. To evaluate
predictions beyond the immediate setting, the study also had a follow up, in which
consumption and other outcome measures were assessed 7 days later. At follow up
we also measured action control, a metacognitive self-regulatory process that has
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been shown to facilitate the translation of intentions into action (Sniehotta, Nagy,
Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2006). So doing allowed us to assess whether the SSAM pre-
dicted this important self-regulatory process. We hypothesized that it would, primarily
because action control involves processes of awareness and monitoring of standards,
and self-regulatory eﬀort, that we presumed are qualities possessed by those higher
in SSAM.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited by email from a pool of university staﬀ, graduate and
undergraduate students to take part in a study of diet and health beliefs in exchange
for entry into a prize draw for up to £50 (approximately $80 at the time). Two hundred
and forty-eight participants with no missing values on the time 1 measures (enabling
the calculation of full diagnostic statistics in AMOS) comprise the sample. They ranged in
age from 18 to 58 years (M = 22.7 years, SD = 6.73), were predominantly female (73%,
n = 180), student (94%, n = 233), and white (85%, n = 211). (A participant ﬂow diagram
can be found in supplemental materials: Figure S2).
Initial measures
The following measures (in sequence) were taken before participants were given the
link to the main study. Demographic questions (sex, age, occupation, ethnicity and
education level) were followed by items assessing fruit and vegetable consumption,
including baseline fruit and vegetable consumption, which was assessed using three
measures. A link to UK National Health Service information on portion sizes was
provided on each page. Measure 1 (Steptoe et al., 2003) assessed consumption on
a typical day (one item each for fruit and vegetables, e.g. “How many portions of fruit
– of any kind – do you eat on a typical day?”). Measure 2 (from the Cambridge Food
Frequency Questionnaire, Bingham et al., 1994) assessed fruit and vegetable con-
sumption in the previous 24 hours by providing participants with a comprehensive
list of vegetables and fruit and asking them to indicate how many portions of each
they had eaten. Measure 3 (Wardle, Parmenter, & Waller, 2000) assessed consumption
in a typical week by asking participants to record how many portions they ate from a
list of foodstuﬀs using a 7-point scale (None; less than 1 a week; 1–2 a week; 3–5 a
week; 6–7 a week; 8–11 a week; 12 or more a week). Given the diﬀerent response
scales, the measures were standardized before being combined (α = .74; c/f Harris
et al., 2014). Eligible participants then received the link to the main study.8.
Experimental manipulation
Using a standard online self-aﬃrmation manipulation (e.g., Harris et al., 2014), partici-
pants were randomized either to write about their most important value (self-aﬃrmation
condition) giving three reasons why this value was important to them plus an example
of something they do to demonstrate it, or to write about why their least important
value might be important to someone else (control condition) giving three reasons why
this value might be important to someone else plus an example of something they
might do to demonstrate it.9
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Health message
The message was the same as reported in Harris et al. (2014). It was based on materials
from the UK Department of Health (2010ab) and Crowe et al. (2011). It described the
health beneﬁts of eating fruit and vegetables and comprised a series of screens explicitly
stating the UK guidelines, describing the evidence concerning the beneﬁts to health,
outlining how fruit and vegetables may work, and why vitamin supplementation is less
beneﬁcial. It ended with reminders to eat at least 5 portions every day, advice on portion
size and how to increase consumption, and details of where to get more information.
Dependent measures
Measures from BRT (Westaby, 2005) assessed reason endorsement. Participants were
presented with six reasons for eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables every
day (e.g., “because it would help me prevent some illnesses”) and four against doing so
(e.g., “because it would be too expensive”) (order counterbalanced). In each case they
were asked to indicate whether for them it was a reason (0, not a reason; 1, reason). They
were also given space to record any reasons for/against that were not on the list but
that were important to them. Following the guidelines in Westaby (2005), the reasons
had been generated from a pilot study.
After completing these measures, participants were presented with the TPB items
(mostly adapted from Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 2007). Items measured inten-
tions (three items, e.g., “I intend eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables every
day in the next 7 days”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree; α = .94), attitudes (α = .85;
“For me eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables every day in the next 7 days
would be . . .”) comprising aﬀective attitudes (four items, unenjoyable [1] – enjoyable [7],
boring [1] – fun [7], painful [1] – pleasurable [7], bad [1] – good [7]; α = .83) and cognitive
attitudes (four items, foolish [1] – wise [7], harmful [1] – beneﬁcial [7], useless [1] – useful
[7], unimportant [1] – important [7]; α = .81), injunctive norms (three items, e.g., “Most
people who are important to me think that I should eat at least 5 portions of fruit and
vegetables every day in the next 7 days”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree; α = .69),
descriptive norms (three items, e.g., “Most people I know will eat at least 5 portions of
fruit and vegetables every day in the next 7 days”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree;
α = .88), perceived behavioural control (PBC) (three items, e.g., “How much control do
you have over whether or not you will eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables
every day in the next 7 days?”, 1, no control, 7, complete control; α = .92), and self-eﬃcacy
(three items, e.g., “I know for sure that if I wanted to I could eat at least 5 portions of fruit
and vegetables every day in the next 7 days”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly agree;
α = .89). In addition, we used Godin et al.’s (2012) moral norms measure (three items,
e.g., “I feel morally obliged to eat at least 5 fruit and vegetables every day in the next 7
days”, 1, deﬁnitely no, 7, deﬁnitely yes; α = .74).
Then followed measures of message derogation (adapted from Jessop et al., 2009;
four items, e.g., “The message in the article was. . . exaggerated/misleading/manipula-
tive/convincing [latter item reverse coded]”, 1, not at all, 7, extremely; α = .76), message-
related anger (Gardner, 2010; two items, “The article made me feel . . . irritated/angry, 1,
not at all, 7, extremely; α = .75), and denial (two measures from Thompson et al., 2011):
personal relevance denial (four items, e.g., “Is NOT eating at least 5 portions of fruit and
vegetables every day a relevant threat to you?”, 1, not at all, 7, very much; α = .82) and
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self-exempting belief denial (ﬁve items, e.g., “You don’t really need to worry about
eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables every day unless you have a very
unhealthy lifestyle, 1, not at all, 7, very much; α = .77). Higher scores therefore indicate
less personal relevance denial but more self-exempting belief denial.
The survey closed with a section containing a retrospective manipulation check (three
items from Napper et al., 2009; α = .83) followed by the 5-item HIPT, SSAM, SCS, and
demographic items. The ﬁnal page had a link to a UK NHS 5 a day site (Department of
Health, 2010a, 2010b).
Seven days later, participants were automatically emailed the link to the follow up
questionnaire, including the same consumption measures and TPB items used pre-
viously (αs = .77 to .94) plus the measure of action control (Sniehotta et al., 2006; six
items, e.g., “During the last 7 days, I have. . . . . . often had an intention to eat at least 5
portions of fruit and vegetables every day on my mind”, 1, strongly disagree, 7, strongly
agree, α = .93). The follow-up concluded with a set of funnel debrieﬁng questions
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).
Results
A table describing the model ﬁt statistics can be found in the Study 5 supplemental
materials.
The SSAM had signiﬁcant or near signiﬁcant correlations with almost all variables,
whereas those involving the HIPT and SCS were sporadic (see Table 6).
SEM analyses: baseline consumption
The SSAM was the sole signiﬁcant predictor of consumption, indicating that it was a diag-
nostic indicator of a healthy diet asmeasured by fruit and vegetable intake. As a consequence,
we added baseline consumption at a second step in the SEM regression models reported
below, and as a step in regression analyses of the follow up data, to examine whether the
SSAM predicted responses after controlling for pre-existing dietary behavior.
SEM analyses: reasons for and against
The SSAM was the sole signiﬁcant predictor of tendency to endorse reasons for eating at
least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables in the subsequent 7 days; self-compassion was
the sole signiﬁcant predictor of tendency to reject reasons against doing so. These
ﬁndings did not change when baseline consumption was added to the predictive
model, although self-aﬃrmation condition became a signiﬁcant predictor of reasons for.
SEM analyses: denial, derogation and anger
The SSAM was the sole signiﬁcant predictor of personal relevance denial (PRD) and self-
exempting belief denial (SEBD), predicting less denial in each case. When baseline
consumption was added as a predictor, the SSAM still predicted PRD but not SEBD.
No variable signiﬁcantly predicted message derogation or anger.
SEM analyses: TPB plus moral norms
The SSAM was the sole signiﬁcant predictor, positively predicting intentions, attitudes
(diﬀerentiating the aﬀective and cognitive components aﬀected the size of the
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relationships but not the statistical signiﬁcance), injunctive norms, moral norms, PBC,
and self-eﬃcacy. There were no signiﬁcant predictors of descriptive norms. When base-
line consumption was added to the model, the SSAM no longer predicted moral norms,
PBC, or intentions, but became a signiﬁcant (positive) predictor of descriptive norms.
Interaction eﬀects
Following the procedure adopted in study 4, we used regression analyses on the mean
scale scores to examine the interactive eﬀects of the SSAM with the self-compassion
scale. There was a signiﬁcant interaction on attitudes (-.14, p = .016) and that on SEBD
approached signiﬁcance (.12, p = .052). These interactions imply that the positive
relation between the SSAM and attitudes, and the negative relation between SSAM
and SEBD, were weaker for those higher in self-compassion.
Table 6. Study 5. Measures of motivation for behavior change: Correlations and standardized
regression coeﬃcients (Time 1).
SSAM HIPT SCS
Correlation coeﬃcients
Baseline fruit & vegetable consumption .15* −.01 −.03
controlling for outliersa .14^ −.03 −.04
Reasons for eating more .26*** .11^ .11^
Reasons against eating more −.13^ −.03 −.15*
Intentions to eat more .21** .05 .03
Attitudes overall .24** .05 .09
Aﬀective attitudes .19* .05 .06
Cognitive attitudes .22** .03 .11^
Injunctive norms .30*** .22*** .13*
Descriptive norms .23*** .21** .15*
Moral norms .24** .09 .05
Perceived Behavioral Control .16* .07 −.01
Self-eﬃcacy .30*** .18** .13*
Message derogation −.14^ −.02 −.05
Anger induced by message −.13^ −.06 −.09
Personal relevance denialb .19* .05 .03
Self-exempting belief denialb −.14^ −.02 −.05
SEM coeﬃcients
Baseline fruit & vegetable consumption .21* −.06 −.04
controlling for outliersa .21* −.10 −.02
Reasons for eating more .24** −.02 .04
Reasons against eating more −.07 .15 −.30**
Intentions to eat more .20* −.04 .06
Attitudes overall .24** −.11 .09
Aﬀective attitudes .19* −.05 .05
Cognitive attitudes .24** −.15 .11
Injunctive norms .25** .13 −.03
Descriptive norms .10 .16^ .07
Moral norms .22* .03 −.001
Perceived Behavioral Control .19* .06 −.12
Self-eﬃcacy .27* .08 −.02
Message derogation −.14 .08 −.08
Anger induced by message −.11 .04 −.08
Personal relevance denialb .21* −.03 −.01
Self-exempting belief denialb −.17* .09 −.05
Notes. N = 248. SSAM = Spontaneous Self-Aﬃrmation Measure; HIPT = Habitual Index of Positive Thinking; SCS
= Self-Compassion Scale. SEM analyses include self-aﬃrmation condition (−1, control, + 1 experimental). The
core measures are latent variables; the outcome variables are summary scores.
a Reported consumption of fruit and vegetables after removal of outliers (± 2 SDs of the mean). b Higher
scores indicate less personal relevance denial but more self-exempting belief denial.
^p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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Likewise, we computed cross-product terms between the mean-centered SSAM
scores and the mean-centered consumption scores to test the interactive eﬀects of
the SSAM with baseline fruit and vegetable consumption. There were signiﬁcant inter-
actions between SSAM and consumption for intentions (-.13, p = .007), moral norm (-.13,
p = .026), PBC (-.13, p = .033) and self-eﬃcacy (-.21, p < .001). The direction of this set of
interactions implied that the tendency for individuals higher in SSAM to be more
accepting of the message was stronger among those higher in threat-relevance, as
measured by their lower consumption of fruit and vegetables.
In addition, as in Study 4, we used regression analyses on the mean scale scores to
examine the interactive eﬀects of the SSAM with the self-aﬃrmation manipulation. One
interaction, that with message derogation, approached signiﬁcance, (β = -.11, p = .074),
implying that the reduction in derogation related to the SSAM was greater in the
experimental condition. Full details of these ﬁndings can be found in the Study 5
supplemental materials.
Follow up
Of the time 1 participants, 160 responded to the follow up (64.5%). We ﬁrst examined
whether reported fruit and vegetable consumption at follow-up was related to the
SSAM. Not surprisingly, individual diﬀerences in consumption were highly stable
(r = .67, p < .001). The SSAM, measured at Time 1, was equally predictive of Time 2
consumption (r = .20, p = .012) as of Time 1 consumption (r = .15, p = .016), when
examining follow-up participants only. Because of the smaller sample size at follow-up,
instead of SEM analyses we conducted a series of hierarchical linear regressions on
summed scale scores: SSAM (α = .93) was entered at step 1, the self-aﬃrmation condi-
tion, the HIPT (α = .96) and SCS (α = .82) at step 2, and baseline fruit and vegetable
consumption at step 3. Baseline consumption was a signiﬁcant positive predictor of all
follow up variables.
At all three steps the SSAM predicted: attitudes (.28, p = .002), injunctive norms (.34,
p < .001), and moral norms (.22, p = .017) (all β at step 3). At steps 1 and 2, but not at
step 3, the SSAM signiﬁcantly predicted intentions (.21, p = .026) and action control (.22,
p = .022) (both β at step 2). At step 1, but not at subsequent steps, the SSAM
signiﬁcantly predicted follow-up consumption (.20, p = .012), descriptive norms (.23,
p = .004), PBC (.24, p = .003) and self-eﬃcacy (.19, p = .018) (all β at step 1).
At step 2, self-compassion predicted injunctive norms (-.17, p = .047), but this eﬀect
only approached signiﬁcance at step 3. The HIPT was not a signiﬁcant predictor of any
variable at either step.
Interaction eﬀects
We again used regression analyses on the mean scale scores to examine the interactive
eﬀects of the SSAM. The interaction terms were added as a ﬁnal step to the hierarchical
regressions reported above; adding the interaction at step 3 instead, with baseline
consumption as the ﬁnal step, did not aﬀect the conclusions.
There were only two signiﬁcant SSAM x Self-Compassion Scale eﬀects: on moral
norms (-.18, p = .017) and intentions (-.15, p = .022). The direction of these interactions
implies that the positive eﬀects of the SSAM on moral norms and intentions were
attenuated for those high in self-compassion. Likewise, there were two signiﬁcant
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interactions between SSAM and baseline consumption of fruit and vegetables: on
consumption at follow up (excluding outliers, -.17, p = .006) and attitudes (-.18,
p = .019). The direction of these interactions implies that the tendency for individuals
higher in SSAM to consume more, and to hold more positive attitudes, was accentuated
among those also high in threat-relevance, as measured by lower fruit and vegetable
consumption at baseline. There were no signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects involving the
SSAM and self-aﬃrmation condition at follow up (see Study 5 supplemental materials).
Discussion
As hypothesized, the SSAM predicted more open-minded acceptance of the dietary
message and greater motivation for behavior change. At time 1 the SSAM predicted
more fruit and vegetable consumption and, in response to the message, stronger
intentions, attitudes, PBC, self-eﬃcacy, injunctive norms, higher moral norms, greater
personal relevance, and less tendency to exempt the self from needing to worry about
the threat. Indeed, at time 1 the SSAM was typically the sole predictor in the model. The
SSAM was also the sole signiﬁcant predictor of the tendency to endorse more reasons
for eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables daily. The SCS was the sole
signiﬁcant predictor of the tendency to endorse reasons against, predicting endorsing
fewer of these reasons.
The SSAM was also a frequent predictor of the follow-up variables, including follow-
up consumption (at step 1) and action control. Most of these relations were maintained
after controlling for the HIPT and SCS, including those with action control, intentions
and several measures indicative of maintained motivation for change. Indeed, relation-
ships with attitudes, injunctive norms, and moral norms remained signiﬁcant even when
controlling for baseline consumption. The SCS and HIPT predicted little at follow up and
then only marginally.
In contrast to Study 4, where high self-esteem interacted with SSAM to strengthen several
of the positive relations found between the SSAM and open-minded processing, self-
compassion rarely aﬀected the positive relations between the SSAM and indices of readiness
to change behavior, and when it did it typically weakened these relationships. This under-
lines the distinction between self-esteem and self-compassion and raises the possibility that,
unlike self-esteem, self-compassion may serve as an alternative route to self-aﬃrmation in
dealing with threats to the self, and is in that sense a substitute rather than a complement.
Once again, the relationships with the SSAM mirrored the ﬁndings of studies using
experimental manipulations of self-aﬃrmation, in this case both generally in relation to
health risk-information (e.g., Epton et al., 2015), and speciﬁcally in relation to fruit and
vegetable consumption, where self-aﬃrmation has boosted reports of consumption,
intentions, and predictors of intentions following messages much like the one employed
in the current study (e.g., Epton & Harris, 2008; Fielden, Harris, Sillence, & Little, 2016;
Harris et al., 2014; Napper et al., 2014; Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2011). This is further
evidence of parallels between the consequences of being high in SSAM and experi-
mental manipulations.
Again, there was little evidence that the SSAM interacted with self-aﬃrmation condi-
tion. However, interpretation of this is again complicated by the scarcity of main eﬀects
involving condition.
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Of note, although most predictions were supported, those involving the derogation
and reactance measures were not. Our initial evidence suggests that, contrary to
hypothesis, the SSAM is independent of these aﬀect-laden sources of bias and distortion,
rather than negatively related to them.
In sum, the individual diﬀerence measured by the SSAM was associated with a range
of indices of less defensive and more adaptive responding to the information, even after
controlling for its relationships with the HIPT and SCS. The SSAM also predicted reports
of consumption, both concurrently and subsequently. Overall, the SSAM was uniquely
predictive of more open-minded and adaptive responses to the threat materials, con-
sistent with ﬁndings from the experimental literature.
Section 5: the SSAM ﬁrst-order factors
In this paper, and in the initial phases of our research program, we have focused
primarily on the overall (higher-order) SSAM. In part this reﬂects the fact that there is
no clear rationale in Self-Aﬃrmation Theory for hypothesizing any consistently distinc-
tive implications of a given source. Nevertheless, we did hypothesize that SSAM
strengths would be more closely related to trait self-esteem than would SSAM values
or social relations (hypothesis 5) – a hypothesis that has been repeatedly supported
throughout – and, for exploratory purposes, we routinely tested the relations between
these three sources, as measured by the SSAM ﬁrst-order factors, and each of the
outcomes assessed in the studies reported in this paper. These exploratory analyses
are reported in supplemental materials in tables containing the zero-order correlations
between each core measure and the outcome and the standardized coeﬃcients from a
series of hierarchical regression SEM models in the following sequence: (1) prediction by
each of the three latent SSAM factors (representing a focus on values, strengths or
relations), followed by (2) addition of the HIPT and (3) the RSES. This enabled us both to
observe the changes at each step and assess whether a speciﬁc ﬁrst-order factor is a
residual predictor.
Table S9 in supplemental materials summarizes the ﬁndings and indicates that the
three SSAM factors had numerous distinctive residual relationships. Notably, a focus on
strengths had several characteristic relationships relative to a focus on either values or
social relations, even after controlling for the RSES and HIPT. Strengths – stripped of the
common variance shared with values and social relations – was a negative predictor of
self-clarity and the only SSAM factor predicting defensiveness, the two self-enhancing
SESPSS responses (positivity embracement and favorable construals), the CSAI scale (and
most of its items – see Study 2 supplemental materials) and RISP heuristic processing (all
positively); it also negatively predicted several processing measures (depth of thought
and relevance) in Study 4. In contrast, SSAM values uniquely and positively predicted
self-clarity, the morality factor of the SIS, the self-judgment subscale of the SCS, control-
based optimism, RISP systematic processing, plus depth of thought and the two rele-
vance measures in Study 4. Many other diﬀerences are apparent in tables in the
Additional Findings sections of the supplemental materials. Study 5 also revealed
some diﬀerences in predictive relations. These ﬁndings indicate some striking diﬀer-
ences in the associations and potential implications of a focus on strengths and on
values that are worth pursuing in future research. Furthermore, the tendency to focus on
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social relations was often a positive (and frequently the sole) predictor of many of the
measures in studies 4 and 5, suggesting this focus may also have distinctive implications.
However, overall the eﬀects of the unique individual SSAM factors, when they occurred,
were often statistically marginal, whereas the eﬀects involving the overall (higher-order)
SSAM were typically more numerous and sizable.
General discussion
In this paper we have sought to explore classic themes from self-aﬃrmation research in
the domain of individual diﬀerences. For that purpose, guided by the experimental
literature, we developed items to measure spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and examined
the correlational and predictive relationships of the resulting measure. In this concluding
section, we review the main ﬁndings of the paper and their implications.
Our ﬁrst empirical goal was to establish the degree of dependence among self-
aﬃrmation as a characteristic response to psychological threat (measured by the
SSAM), habitual access to positive self-thoughts (measured by the HIPT), and trait self-
esteem (measured by the RSES). To do this, we established the degree of empirical
overlap among the three core measures in a large number of samples (Goal 1); further-
more we evaluated their joint and unique contributions to variance in a wide range of
measures and outcomes, both cross-sectional and predictive (Goal 2).
Relevant to Goal 1, the empirical overlaps between the SSAM and the measures of
positive self-evaluation (HIPT, RSES) were modest, especially given that the SEM models
provide latent correlations disattenuated for any measurement error (mean sample-size
weighted latent correlation between the SSAM and the RSES across the independent
studies reported in the body of this paper was .46 (with values ranging from .42 to .55);
between the SSAM and the HIPT the mean was .38 (ranging from .25 to .43). Not
surprisingly, the overlap between the HIPT and RSES was stronger due to their con-
ceptual similarity (mean = .74, with values ranging from .53 to .82). These values indicate
moderate overlap and hence considerable independence between the SSAM and the
other two core variables (the HIPT and RSES).
Relevant to Goal 2, the ﬁndings reported here indicate that there were many variables
for which there was independent prediction by the SSAM, whether alone or alongside
one or more of the other core variables. The SSAM was positively and uniquely related to
the self-aﬃrming reﬂections subscale of the SESPSS, to optimism rooted in behavioral
control rather than optimistic denial, to the tendency to report processing information
systematically, to both positive and negative components of self-compassion, and to the
readiness to embrace and respond to threatening health materials. In contrast, the SSAM
did not predict defensiveness or the more self-enhancing strategies (positivity embrace-
ment, favorable construals) measured by the SESPSS, or the tendency to report proces-
sing information heuristically. The SSAM predicted many other outcomes alongside
prediction by one or other of the core variables. Overall, as hypothesized, the character-
istic SSAM elements appear to comprise those aspects of self-functioning that are
indicative of the ability to embrace threat and challenge (and to do so even when
controlling for the quantity and accessibility of self-esteem).
Of note, there was also evidence that the HIPT, like the SSAM, predicts in addition to
the RSES, in opposition to the RSES (e.g., defensiveness, message processing variables)
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and when the RSES does not (e.g., control-based optimism). These ﬁndings indicate that
the HIPT, although assessing a tendency likely diagnostic of those high in trait self-
esteem, has certain distinctive correlates and consequences. Indeed, some aspects of the
ﬁndings suggest that the residual features of the HIPT may encourage open-minded
responsiveness and might even isolate genuinely held automatic positivity; in contrast,
the residual features of the RSES may assess less genuinely but more consciously held
positivity that cannot so readily be deployed to confront threat and challenge, except by
self-protective strategies. Future research might usefully address this possibility and,
more generally, examine the impact of diﬀerentiating defensive from secure high self-
esteem on processes and outcomes.
In contrast to the diversity of ﬁndings when relating the core measures to concurrent
assessments, there was much more uniformity in the patterns of prediction for the
outcomes measured prospectively in the context of health threats. Notably, the SSAM
predicted virtually all outcomes, and was often the sole signiﬁcant predictor. Moreover,
it predicted these outcomes positively (as on occasion did the HIPT) whereas the RSES
typically predicted them negatively. The two studies on health threats thus provide
insights into how self-aﬃrmation and self-evaluation act in combination and demon-
strate that the self-aﬃrmation response, as measured by the SSAM, is often uniquely
predictive of reduced defensiveness.
In study 4 self-esteem interacted with spontaneous self-aﬃrmation to strengthen
several of the positive relations found between the SSAM and open-minded processing,
supporting the view that self-esteem is complementary to self-aﬃrmation as a route to
reducing threats to the self (cf. Spencer et al., 1993). In contrast, in Study 5 self-
compassion rarely altered the many positive relations between the SSAM and indices
of readiness to change behavior, and when it did it typically weakened them, suggesting
that self-compassion may serve as an alternative route to self-aﬃrmation in dealing with
threats to the self, and is a substitute rather than complement. Further research should
explore the conditions under which these and other aspects of self-regard operate as
alternative or complementary routes to self-aﬃrmation and whether or not relevant self-
resources need to be rendered cognitively accessible in order to be deployed.
In studies 4 and 5 there was also evidence that the SSAM interacted with threat-
relevance, echoing ﬁndings in the experimental literature. However, there was little
evidence that the SSAM interacted with the self-aﬃrmation manipulations themselves.
Interpretation of this latter ﬁnding is complicated by the general lack of eﬀects involving
condition in either study and the novelty of the embedded manipulation in Study 4. The
paucity of eﬀects involving these aﬃrmation manipulations is worthy of note as it occurs
against a backdrop of studies typically reporting signiﬁcant eﬀects (e.g., Epton et al.,
2015). Nevertheless, it is always diﬃcult to interpret null eﬀects, especially following a
novel manipulation like that in Study 4.
Currently there is no clear rationale in Self-Aﬃrmation Theory for hypothesizing any
consistently distinctive implications of a given source of self-aﬃrmation. Nevertheless,
our hypothesis that SSAM strengths would be more closely related to trait self-esteem
than would SSAM values or social relations (hypothesis 5) was supported and our
exploratory analyses revealed some striking diﬀerences in the associations and potential
implications of the three diﬀerent sources of self-aﬃrmation measured by the SSAM that
are worth pursuing in future research. These include diﬀerences in the pattern of
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correlations and unique predictions that suggest that values and social relations may be
associated with greater openness to threatening information than is a focus on
strengths. This is consistent with the recent suggestion that certain types of aﬃrmation
(such as unconditional sources of integrity derived from social relations) may be more
eﬀective than others (such as those that focus people on narrow self-centered values or
sources conditional on meeting external standards; Cohen & Sherman, 2014). The
evidence concerning social relations is also consistent with explanations in terms of
self-transcendence (Burson et al., 2012), belonging (e.g., Knowles, Lucas, Molden,
Gardner, & Dean, 2010) and the beneﬁts of group memberships (Jetten, Haslam, &
Haslam, 2011). However, it should be noted that there were typically fewer signiﬁcant
relations of the unique individual SSAM factors than of the overall (higher-order) SSAM.
Although the principal aim of these studies was to explore the overlap between
individual diﬀerences in self-aﬃrmation in reported response to threat and individual
diﬀerences in self-evaluation, one important outcome has been the creation and valida-
tion of a ﬂexible measure of spontaneous self-aﬃrmation for research use. The resulting
measure, the SSAM, adds to the repository a relatively brief set of items that have been
road-tested and have more validity evidence than any other available measure of self-
aﬃrmation. The measure is also easily shortened and is designed to be modular: given
its structure it is easily adapted for other self-relevant content (items can be created to
measure sources of self-aﬃrmation other than values, strengths and social relations as
the need arises). It is also the only available self-aﬃrmation measure that has identiﬁed
sub-scales, allowing the diﬀerential exploration of the implications of a relative focus on,
for instance, strengths, values or social relations. Despite their merits, other available
measures appear to be more heavily weighted towards self-esteem (e.g., the SIS) or to
measure self-aﬃrmation based mainly on strengths and attributes (the CSAI scale). Most
lack or have few conditional items specifying responding to threat (e.g., the CSAI scale,
the SAR), an aspect seen as a deﬁning characteristic of self-aﬃrmation by many theorists
(see McQueen & Klein, 2006). Nevertheless, researchers can use the evidence presented
here to choose which of the available measures purporting to assess spontaneous self-
aﬃrmation is most appropriate for a given study.
Research on self-aﬃrmation as a characteristic response to threat is in its infancy
relative to work on self-aﬃrmation as an experimental manipulation and, naturally,
many questions remain (see Cohen & Sherman, 2014). One such question concerns
whether spontaneous self-aﬃrmation is typically beneﬁcial or detrimental. Evidence
from the current studies suggests that, as we hypothesized, the tendency to self-aﬃrm
naturally is associated predominantly with greater openness to threatening information
and with generally adaptive responses to challenges and threats. Indeed, being higher in
spontaneous self-aﬃrmation as measured by the SSAM was associated with a range of
positive qualities, characteristics and response tendencies, including beneﬁcial reduc-
tions in defensiveness much akin to those demonstrated using experimental manipula-
tions of self-aﬃrmation. Other studies using items from the SSAM show similar positive
relations with coping under threat. For instance, in data from a nationally representative
US survey (the Health Information National Trends Survey), spontaneous self-aﬃrmation
(measured by two SSAM items) was associated with less cognitive impairment and more
positive aﬀect among cancer survivors in the sample (Taber, Klein, Ferrer, Kent, & Harris,
2016) and, in the full sample, with indices of well-being (Emanuel et al., 2016), more
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positive health care experiences and greater information seeking (Taber et al., 2016);
smokers in the sample who scored higher on these SSAM items also reported more quit
attempts and quit intentions if they lived in states with more comprehensive smoke-free
laws, suggesting they were less reactant (Persoskie et al., 2015). In a sample recruited to
an NIH genome sequencing study (ClinSeq®), spontaneous self-aﬃrmation (also mea-
sured by two SSAM items) moderated the negative eﬀects of worry (Ferrer et al., 2015)
and of tendency to avoid information (Taber et al., 2015) on intentions to receive the
genetic sequencing results for preventable diseases. Nevertheless, the possibility
remains that the tendency measured by the SSAM may be associated with detrimental
as well as beneﬁcial processes and outcomes. More generally, discovering how this
tendency relates to the processes by which self-aﬃrmation interventions have been
hypothesized to propagate over time (construal, recursion and interaction; Cohen &
Sherman, 2014) is an important issue for future research.
Potentially related to the overall beneﬁts of being high in spontaneous self-aﬃrma-
tion is the extent to which “spontaneous” self-aﬃrmation is literally spontaneous, in the
sense of being automatic and reactive, or represents an anticipatory, strategic tendency.
We were careful in our wording of the instructions, stem and items not to invite
responses driven by consciously aware or planned uses of self-aﬃrmation, and future
research may fruitfully address the degree to which people diﬀer in the extent to which
they respond to threats deliberately or automatically and whether that is consequential.
There are important ways in which natural or spontaneous self-aﬃrmation and
manipulated self-aﬃrmation may diﬀer. Cohen and Sherman (2014) describe how a
timely self-aﬃrmation can bring about change through subjective construal, recursion,
and interaction (the cycle of “adaptive potential”, p. 335). A chronic or habitual tendency
to self-aﬃrm in response to threat may not have the same features of timeliness,
potentially may have issues of reduced impact through overuse, and may suﬀer from
being explicitly used as a means to an end. Indeed, it is conceivable that usefulness may
vary depending on whether people engage in self-aﬃrmation spontaneously with little
thought for the consequences – it is just something they do – or whether they do it with
the goal of making themselves feel better (Sherman et al., 2009). However, Silverman,
Logel, and Cohen (2013) have shown how freedom to choose whether or not to self-
aﬃrm can override the eﬀects of awareness on the outcomes of self-aﬃrmation, which
may be why spontaneous self-aﬃrmation as measured by the SSAM has been found to
date to be associated more often with positive than negative eﬀects. Likewise, one of
the consequences of a tendency to engage in self-aﬃrmation spontaneously might be
to reduce the tendency to experience threat. That is, the world may seem a less
threatening place as a result of being naturally prone to respond to threats by self-
aﬃrming. Perhaps those high in this tendency have additional skills that enable them to
use self-aﬃrmation at key moments and in ways that are predominantly eﬀective. It may
be useful to examine spontaneous self-aﬃrmation as it emerges in daily events and
interactions, perhaps using experience-sampling techniques, and to assess whether its
eﬀects vary with proneness to experience threat. There remains also a possibility that
the tendency to naturally self-aﬃrm might manifest itself in diﬀerent ways across
diﬀerent people and contexts. Indeed, our studies have provided some initial evidence
of possible diﬀerential eﬀects associated with focusing on the diﬀerent sources of self-
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aﬃrmation (see Section 5). These, and other related questions, provide a rich set of
possibilities for future research.
The studies have generated a large number of ﬁndings with important implications,
but inevitably have limitations that future studies may address. Consistent with the
focus on the initial exploration of the correlates of, and prediction by, the core measures,
the data are often cross-sectional and self-reported. Some of the outcome measures
used here are brief and associated ﬁndings require replication with fuller versions or
suitable alternatives. There is a considerable number of analyses, so some caution needs
to be exercised in interpreting individual ﬁndings, especially those that are statistically
marginal. We chose not to correct our signiﬁcance tests for family-wise error rates given
that we combined a few core tests with a multitude of secondary, exploratory analyses
and we focus on interpreting the broad sweep of highly consistent ﬁndings, rather than
speciﬁc outcomes. A number of key patterns have been replicated across the studies
presented here; however, we recognize the importance of, and need for, their indepen-
dent replication in future work. Furthermore, the generality of the eﬀects in groups and
cultures other than those sampled here needs to be established. Testing of the pre-
dictive validity of the SSAM and HIPT in contexts other than health, alongside other
relevant measures as well as measures of self-esteem or self-compassion, will help
broaden our understanding of their respective implications and the processes involved.
Notes
1. Indeed, the widespread tendency to use values aﬃrmations as the means of successfully
inducing self-aﬃrmation (e.g., McQueen & Klein, 2006) relies on values-based resources
being available to a wide range of participants, and ﬁndings indicating that those low in
self-esteem are not disadvantaged by such manipulations (e.g., Napper et al., 2009) or may
even beneﬁt most from them (e.g., Düring & Jessop, 2014) suggest that low self-esteem
participants can ﬁnd values with which to self-aﬃrm.
2. In addition, to control for response tendency, the SSAM contained three ﬁller negative
items. These are not included in analyses reported in this paper.
3. One SSA item (“Thinking about the things I can control”) did not load suﬃciently on any of
the three factors. Three other SSA items (“Recalling times I did the right thing”, “Thinking
about the things that I value about myself”, and “Thinking about the things that are
important to me”) loaded too highly on two diﬀerent factors, presumably because they
could refer either to personal values or personal strengths. Consequently, these four items
were dropped from the analysis. In a preliminary EFA model, all but one of the of HIPT items
loaded satisfactorily on a single factor. The exception (“I don’t do consciously”) was dropped
from the analysis.
4. Of note, the correlation between the SSAM and the self-aﬃrming reﬂections subscale (.77)
was signiﬁcantly higher than either the correlation between the HIPT and the subscale (.46),
χ2(1) = 48.82, p < . 001, or that between the RSES and the subscale (.49), χ2(1) = 56.50,
p < .001.
5. Of note, however, self-clarity was predicted by the SSAM values factor (.15, p = .026; see
Study 1 supplemental materials).
6. In the embedded self-aﬃrmation condition participants were required to choose one of the
three sources of self-aﬃrmation in the SSAM to think about when reading the brochure. For
further details, see the Study 4 supplemental materials.
7. Experimental condition was included as a predictor in all analyses in studies 4 and 5.
8. A participant ﬂow diagram can be found in supplemental materials (Figure S2).
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9. Immediately before and after the self-aﬃrmation manipulation we assessed feelings of state
self-compassion (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Immediately after the manipulation we also
measured several other variables, including positive other-related aﬀect (Crocker, Niiya, &
Mischkowski, 2008), mood (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003), self-evaluative certainty and sub-
jective self-ambivalence (DeMarree, Morrison, Wheeler, & Petty, 2011). Findings are reported
in the Study 5 supplemental materials.
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